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MEGACASES, DIVERSITY, AND THE
ELUSIVE GOAL OF WORKPLACE REFORM
NANCY LEVIT *
Abstract: Structural reform litigation, lawsuits that aim to create systemic'
change, dates back to the school desegregation cases of the 1950s and to-
day continues with employment discrimination class action suits. Some of'
America's most important companies—Home Depot, Texaco, and Coca-
Cola among them—have been subject to such litigation. This Article dis-
cusses the legal impetus towards the settling of such suits via consent de-
crees, and it examines several major consent decrees and the factors in-
fluencing the success or failure of each. The Article concludes that the
defendant's acceptance of the desirability of creating a diverse workplace,
coupled with making specific people accountable for delivering diversity,
is a key component to a successful consent decree.
INTRODUCTION
Class actions have changed the stakes of employment discrimina-
tion litigation. The initial workplace cases, although critical in address-
ing discriminatory practices, overwhelmingly involved individual claims.'
That changed with the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 2 It expanded compen-
satory and punitive damages, and made jury trials a matter of rights
thus providing economic incentives for class claims. From 2001 to
2004, a time when the number of class action suits was decreasing
across the board, the number of employment discrimination class suits
rose by sixty-seven percent. 4 These cases have produced scores of mul-
* Copyright 0 2008 Nancy Levit, Curators' and Edward D. Ellison Professor of Law at
the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. I am indebted to the following peo-
ple for advice, comments, editing suggestions, and intellectual noodling: David Achten-
berg, Theresa Beiner, June Carbone, Bill Colby, Aaron Geary, Tim Geary, Melissa Hart, Jeff
Hirsch, Robert Klonoff, Tony Luppino, Marcia McCormick, Allen Rostron, and Paul
Secunda. Lawrence MacLachlan provided exceptional library and research support. This
project was supported by a generous research grant from the University of Missouri-Kansas
City Law Foundation.
I See, e.g, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 911 U.S. 792, 794 (1973),
2 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000)).
3 42 U.S.C. § 1981 a(c); see also Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions
Survive?. 37 AKRON L. REV, 813. 814 (2004).
Melissa M. Mulkey, Class Dismissed: Defending and Preventing Employment Class Actions in
Your VI/Laplace, 12 14R ADVISOR: LEGAL & PRAC. GUIDANCE, Aug. 2006, at 3 (noting the
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timillion-dollar settlements against some of the nation's largest employ-
ers. 5
 They have encouraged greater use of litigation to address deeply
entrenched corporate practices. In addition, the consent decrees have
inspired increasingly sophisticated social science research on the reme-
dies that do—and do not—make a difference in workplace inclusivity. 6
With successful models of employment discrimination consent decrees
now in place, informed by recent sociological research, the question
now arises: what arc the most successful methods to address workplace
diversity, and are the most promising methods effective only at the risk
of losing the soul of the antidiscrimination principle?
A number of the employment cases against major corporations
from the late 1990s and early 2000s resulted in multimillion-dollar set-
tlements. In 1996, Texaco settled a race discrimination class action for
more than $175 million.? Four years later, Coca-Cola paid over $190
million to settle a class action with similar race allegations. 8 The past
decade has seen a cascade of enormous settlements in discrimination
class action suits: in 1997, Publix Supermarkets, one of the country's
largest grocery chains, paid $81.5 million to settle claims of systematic
sex discrimination in promotions, raises, and wage opportunities by
150,000 women;9 also in 1997, Home Depot agreed to settle a lawsuit by
25,000 current and former employees for discriminatory pay and pro-
motion practices; 19 in 2004, Boeing paid $72 million to settle claims by
almost 18,000 female employees involving similar allegations;" that
same year, brokerage firm Morgan Stanley paid $54 million to settle an
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") suit claiming
sex discrimination and sexual harassment, including outings to strip
clubs, groping of women, and denial of training, mentoring, promo-
tion opportunities, and pay raises to women. 12 Large settlements have
filing of 222 federal employment discrimination class action suits in 2001, and 349 such
suits in 2004). But see Allan Kanner, interpreting the Class Action Fairness Act in a Truly Fair
Manner, 80 Tut. L. Rev. 1645, 1666-67 (2006) (noting hostility of the federal courts to
class actions).
5 See infra notes 7-19 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 369-388 and accompanying text.
7 For a discussion of the Texaco settlement, see infra notes 154-187 and accompanying
text.
8 For a discussion of the Coca-Cola settlement, see infra notes 226-261 and accompa-
nying text.
9 Associated Press, Supermarket Chain Settles Bias Suit, CHI. TRia., Jan. 25, 1997, at 3.
10 For a discussion of the Home Depot settlement, see infra notes 188-206 and accom-
panying text.
II Boeing to Pay .87211110 Settle Sex Discrimination Suit. LAW. WKLY., Nov. 21, 2005, at 22.
is Silyanlal Majumdar, From Glass Ceiling to Pay Cap, Bus. STANDARD, July 16, 2004, at 8.
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occurred in the public sector as well. The U.S. Postal Service just settled
the largest disability discrimination suit in history for $61 million."
In February 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
approved a California federal district court's certification of a class of
potentially more than 1.6 million women in Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc.," the
largest employment discrimination class action in American history."
The plaintiffs claim that Wal-Mart systematically denied women good
job assignments, pay, and promotions." One month earlier, a federal
district court certified a class action against Costco on behalf of ap-
proximately 700 female middle managers.who made allegations similar
to those made against Wal-Mart. 17 One month after the Ninth Circuit
decision, the EEOC filed its largest discrimination action in many
years—a class action lawsuit against Walgreens on behalf of an estimated
10,000 employees, including managers and pharmacists, for discriminatr
ing on the basis of race in store assignments and locations." The EEOC
settled with Walgreens less than six months later for $20 million. 19
Defendants are at risk not just for potential liability but also for
legal expenses. Even if the class certifications are later reversed, the
defense costs and litigation fees for major class actions can run into
the millions of dollars." These costs, both monetary and human,
15 Molly Selvin, Postal Service Settles Bias Suit, L.A. TIMES, June 12, 2007, at 3. The claims
of over 7500 current and former postal workers survived an initial review. Id.
14 474 F.3d 1214. 1222 (9th Cir. 20071.
is Iiill-Mart Faces Bigge,st Sex Bias Case in U.S. History, PITTSBURGH TRIG. REV., Feb. 7,
2007, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.cont/x/pittsburghtrib/s_492070.11t1111,
Ifi Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 141 (N.D. Cal. 2004),
17 Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 240 F.R.D. 627, 636-43 (N.D. Cal. 2007). The simi-
larity of allegations is not surprising, as the plaintiffs' lawyer in Costco, Brad Seligman, is
the same attorney who filed the Wal-Mart class action. A key statistic in the plaintiffs' alle-
gations is that whereas forty-five percent of Costco's employees are female, only thirteen
percent of the company's managers are women. Steven Greenhouse & Michael Barbaro,
Costco Bias Suit Is Given Class-Action Status, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2007, at C9. The plaintiffs
"claimed that women effectively were barred from the top store jobs at Costco because the
company didn't post openings, explain application procedures or provide promotion cri-
teria. Instead, store managers ... are selected informally by a 'tap on the shoulder' in a
process that mostly benefited men ...." Abigail Goldman, California and the West Castro Job-
bias Lawsuit Advances, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2007, at 2.
19 Diane Stafford, Class Action Lawsuit Alleges Discrimination at Walgreens, KANSAS CITY
STAR, Mar. 8, 2007, at Cl.
Walgreens to Pay $20 Million to Settle. Bias Suit, 1-1R.Bt.R.cost, July 16, 2007, http://
hnbIncom/news.aspx:id=76198.
20 See, e.g., Susie Amer, Here Conies Trouble, RESTAURANT Bus., _June 1, 2002, at 14 (noting
that in 1999 when Shoney's entered what was then the largest wage-hour settlement in his-
tory for eighteen million dollars, "after four years of litigation[,] Shoney's defense lawyer fees
alone totaled $7 million"); see also Lynne Duke, Shoney's Bias Settlement Sends $105 Million Sig-
nal, WASH, POST, Feb. 3, 1993, at Al; BRIGHTLINE COMPLIANCE, SAVE MONEY, imp://
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coupled with the potential for adverse publicity as well as liability ex-
posure, have prompted some of the recent massive settlements. 21 The
nature of consent decrees also has changed over the course of the
past decade." In settling these rnegacases, corporations have agreed
to a variety of remedies that have been folded into court-approved
settlements. Some of the larger settlements have specific amounts set
aside for oversight groups, task forces, the creation of training pro-
grams, or revision of personnel procedures." In short, some of these
larger consent decrees have contemplated extensive judicial monitor-
ing over a long period of time and have mandated internal changes in
corporate employment practices.
Employment discrimination class action suits are part of a new
wave of structural reform litigation. Like their predecessors—the
school segregation cases in the 1950s, the housing and voting inequali-
ties cases in the 1960s, prison and jail conditions suits in the 1970s, and
environmental lawsuits in the 1980s and 1990s—these are systemic chal-
lenges to major institutions affecting large segments of the public. 24
Although the total number of employment discrimination class actions
may not be large on a yearly basis, their effects on corporate employ-
ment practices—even for smaller employers who pattern after the lar-
ger shops—can be immense. 25
This.Article explores the effectiveness of employment discrimina-
tion class action suits in reforming workplace cultures, promoting cor-
porate accountability, and implementing real diversity. Because consent
decrees are essentially private resolutions of disputes, it is important to
assess whether companies follow through on the reforms they promise
www.brightlinecompliance.com/training/save-money.html
 (last visited Feb. 15, 2008) (esti-
mating attorneys' fees on a single employment law claim if it goes to trial at $250,000); HEFIR
& AssomxrEs, EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LIABILITY, http://www.hehrassociates.com/html/
epl.hun (last visited Feb. 15, 2008) (estimating the defense cost of the average employment
practices claim that goes to trial at $450,000).
21
 Change in Course: Reeling from Racial Charges, Texaco Does Right Thing, HOUSTON
CottoN., Dec. 20, 1996, at A46 [hereinafter Thermo Does Right Thing].
See infra notes 231-239 and accompanying text (describing the Coca-Cola settle-
ment, which included both monetary damages as well as an independent task force which
operated For five years to implement diversity reform efforts).
23 See infra notes 169, 197, 235 and accompanying text.
21
 Professor Melissa Hart notes, for example, that "Wal-Mart is, after all , the largest pri-
vate employer in the world, with a workforce that is nearly 1% of the U.S. working popula-
tion." Melissa Hart, The Possibility of Avoiding Disnimination: Considering Compliance and Li-
ability, 39 CONN. L. REv. 1623, 1625 (2007).
25
 See infra notes 306-308 and accompanying text.
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to implement and whether those modifications are effective. 26 Review-
ing the architecture and aftermath of consent decrees in five major
employment discrimination cases—the cases against Shoney's, Texaco,
Home Depot, Mitsubishi, and Coca-Cola—the Article evaluates the
ways in which consent decrees have changed over time and the lessons
learned from the implementation of these settlements. 27 This Article
also compares recent social science literature on the efficacy of mecha-
nisms to promote diversity with features of the consent decrees and
later structural and numeric outcomes in these landmark cases. 28
Part I considers the ways in which the contours of employment
discrimination class action suits are changing. 29 It addresses the fac-
tors that are encouraging the twin trends toward settlement of larger
cases and an emphasis on nonmonetary relief." On the procedural
side, the growing consensus that Rule 23(b) (2) class actions are not
an appropriate vehicle for damage awards is channeling employment
discrimination suits toward structural remedies. 31 On the substantive
side, a split exists among the circuits as to whether claims of company-
wide excessive subjectivity in hiring and promotion practices conflict
with class certification requirements of commonality of claims and
predominance of similar issues." The uncertainty of this legal foun-
dation for class claims also pushes plaintiffs toward settlement and the
request for structural changes in employment practices.
Part II of the Article steps back to examine the use of class action
lawsuits as vehicles for reform in contexts outside of employment." It
focuses on class action and other complex litigation in the areas of
prison conditions and civil rights, and how these cases from the 1950s
through the 1980s reconceived the role of the judiciary and redes-
igned public institutions. 34 The emergence of judges more likely to
engage in active oversight of institutions like schools and prisons had
consequences for employment discrimination class litigation: it cre-
ated a judiciary increasingly skilled in managing complex cases and
26 See Tristin K. Green, Targeting Woritplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for Institutional Re-
form, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659,717-18 (2003).
27 See infra notes 132-317 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 318-407 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 48-77 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
' r FED. R. Civ. P. 23(13)(2).
22 Melissa Hart, Learning From Wal-Mart, 10 EMi'. RTS. & EMP. POLY J. 355,375 (2006).
" See infra notes 78-116 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 78-116 and accompanying text.
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served as an implicit warning that judges would be willing to permit
litigation to reshape workplaces.
Part HI looks at the end game of employment discrimination class
action suits." It questions initially whether the threats of negative pub-
licity and prospects of the economic consequences of litigation can in-
duce businesses, particularly large corporations, to be attentive to equal-
ity and diversity issues in the workplace, 36 Although the threats of large
economic losses (from litigation defense costs and risks of damage
awards) and adverse publicity can be the catalysts for settlement, those
economic risks do not, on their own, seem to be sufficient factors to
prompt significant restructuring of workplaces. Both the recent bur-
geoning of employment practices liability insurance and the continued
expansion of the reach of mandatory arbitration undermine the eco-
nomic leverage of class actions to induce changes in corporate behav-
ior.37
The second half of Part III examines the hallmarks of successful
consent decrees. 38 This section identifies several features of more
promising settlements: the tenacity and creativity of courts exercising
oversight and their willingness to appoint judicial surrogates (such as
decree monitors or task forces); the transparency of the process; the
understanding that change requires the dedication of resources and
encompasses a long time span; the creation of progress benchmarks
or goals; and, importantly, the corporation's commitment to changing
its workplace culture." These features emphasize accountability, a
quality that is absolutely critical in reshaping workplaces in terms of
equality and diversity. New research in organizational sociology con-
firms that the implementation of specific practices that make people
accountable for change is more effective in increasing diversity than
educating employees about stereotypes and biases."
These findings have important implications for companies of all
sizes. Though the stakes are higher in class actions, most lawsuits are
35 See infra notes 118-317 and accompanying text.
s6 See infra notes 266-308 and accomnanvintr text.
37 See Richard Michael Fischl, &thinking the Tripartite Division of Ameriran Work Law, 28
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 190-95 (2007) (on mandatory arbitration). See generally
Ed E. Duncan, Insurance Coverage for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 51 PRAC. LAW. 51
(2005) (on employment liability insurance).
38 See infra notes 318-407 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 318-407 and accompanying text.
4° See infra notes 369-388 and accompanying text.
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not class actions, and the overwhelming majority of all lawsuits settle.'"
Lawyers in the employment discrimination arena anticipate that the
lessons learned by larger corporations in Prominent class action litiga-
tion will "'trickle down' to smaller retailers."42 The majority of busi-
nesses suable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title
VIE") have adopted some form of antidiscrimination program, which
usually reouires the business's employees to undergo diversity train-
ing." If one of the conclusions to be drawn from both recent social sci-
ence research and experiences in major class action settlements is that
accountability matters more than education in generating organiza-
tional change, this could prompt smaller companies to revisit their
corporate practices.
The last Section of the Article addresses resistance to change. 44
Unsurprisingly, in those situations in which corporations seemed most
committed to changing their corporate cultures regarding equality and
diversity, consent decrees seemed to work most effectively. The ques-
tion then is what to do about corporate executives who seem most en-
trenched in their current employment practices. One answer may be to
develop an understanding that diversity is good for business. The so-
cioeconomic literature makes a strong case that workplace diversity
creates favorable economic consequences for corporations." Thus, al-
though diversity training programs that stress tolerance and inclusion
on the basis of various identity characteristics may not create apprecia-
ble results in terms of changing workforce demographics and practices,
education about the business case for diversity may generate those re-
sults. One feature emerging from the business management literature
is that smaller to mid-size companies are more resistant than larger
companies to the idea that diversity is economically advantageous."
This may be the target population where education about the business
41 See, e.g., Edward Winter Trapolin, Comment, Sued into Submission: Judicial Creation of
Standards in the Manufacture and Distribution of Lawful Products—The New Orleans Lawsuit
Against Gun Manufacturers, 46 Los'. L. REv. 1275, 1299 (2000) (noting that Inlinety-eight
percent of all lawsuits settle").
42 Rita Bhatnagar, Note, Dukes v. Wal-Mart as a Catalyst for Social Activism, 19 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S 1.4. 246, 248 (2004).
1.3 See Kurt Eichenwald, Texaco Plans Wide Program for Minorities, N.Y. Thus, Dec. 19,
1996, at 1.
44 See infra notes 393-407 and accompanying text.
45 David B, Wilkins, From "Separate Is Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity Is Good for Business":
The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 l-IARv.
L. REv, 1548, 1553 (2004).
46 See Don Gudmundson & Linda S. Hartenian, Workforce Diversity in Small Business: An
Empirical Investigation, 38 J. SMALL Bus. MGMT. 27, 28-29 (2000).
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case for diversity could have the most significant impact. The Article
ends, though, with a question rather than an answer—it asks whether
stressing the market case can eclipse the moral or philosophical case in
favor of diversity. 47
I. THE VOLUME AND STRUCTURE OF CLASS ACTION SUITS
Several new doctrinal developments in the procedural rules for
class certification as well as the substantive law of employment dis-
crimination are combining to channel employment discrimination
class actions toward consent decrees." After describing the volume of
class action suits in recent years, this Part discusses the influence on
settlements of rulings about the propriety of damage awards in Rule
23(b) (2) class actions and the appropriateness of class certification
for claims of excessive subjectivity. 49
The number of employment discrimination class actions filed in
federal court dropped from a high of almost twelve hundred (1174)
in 1976, to a low of thirty-two in 1991.50 In the wake of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, there has been a slow increase in federal employment
class actions,51 with eighty-five filed in 1997-98 and 1998-99. 52 For the
first quarter century after the enactment of Title VII, courts certified
very few employment discrimination class actions. By the mid- to late
47 See infra notes 412-913 and accompanying text
48 See infra notes 50-77 and accompanying text. Consent decrees are the judicial ap-
proval of the parties' consensual settlement, although the court retains equitable jurisdic-
tion to modify the agreement and supervise its enforcement. See Local No. 93, 1nel Ass'n
of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986) (holding that "a federal court
is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree merely because the decree pro-
vides broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial").
12 See infra notes 50-77 and accompanying text.
54J Melissa Hart, lull Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. REV.
813, 820 (2(104) (citing Scott Shively, Resurgence of the Class Action Lawsuit in Employment
Discrimination Cases: New Obstacles Presented by the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act, 23
U. ARK. LITTLE Rocii L. REV. 925, 926 (2001)).
51 Michael W. Hawkins, Current Trends in Class Action Employment Litigation, 19 LAB.
LAw. 33, 34 (2003).
52 Hart, supra note 50, at 829 (citation omitted). Summary data on state class actions are
difficult to obtain; federal court statistics on caseloads are much more complete and avail-
able. Gregory G. Wrobel & Michael I. Waters, Early Returns: Impact of the Class Action Fairness
Act on Federal Jurisdiction over State Law Class Actions, 21 ANTITRUST 45, 49 n.41 (2006). Com-
mentators are in agreement that as federal judges became skeptical of class actions in the
1990s, more were tiled in state court, but in plaintiff-friendly fora, and this was a large part of
the impetus for the Class Action Fairness Act. See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 Tut.. L. REV. 1593, 1595 (20(16).
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1990s, courts began to certify classes with increasing frequency." Al-
though most of the cases that are filed—according to one study, sixty-
nine percent—will not be certified as class actions, a majority of what
would become employment class actions are settled even before a law-
suit is filed."
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"), which expanded
federal subject matter jurisdiction over most damage class actions, fa-
cilitates removal of cases to federal court. 55 CAFA allows defendants to
remove those class actions of 100 or more class members where mini-
mal diversity is met and their claims aggregate to more than $5 mil-
lion . 56
Class action and collective action filings under Title VII, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act
increased significantly in 2006.57 The politics of a conservative
administration may have impeded more aggressive pursuit of EEOC
pattern or practice cases—challenges to an employer's systemic habits
of discrimination. 58 Nonetheless, in 2005, the EEOC established a Sys-
" See Hayley Buckridge, Note, Merging Without Purging: hirentivizing Boards of Directors to
• Promote Diversity Through M & A, 20 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL. COMMENT. 443, 463 (2006).
M Hawkins, supra note 51, at 56.
55 See Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.A. (West 2001 & Stipp. 2006));. see also Robert H. Klonoff, Introduction to the Sympo-
sium: The Twentieth Anniversary of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 74 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L.
REv. 487, 491 (2006) ("CAFA provides that most major class actions (including the lion's
share of multi-state and nationwide class actions) will be heard in federal court."); Alan B.
Morrison, Removing Class Actions to Federal Court: A Better Way to Handle the Problem of Over-
lapping Class Actions, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1535 (2005).
56 28 U.S.CA. § 1332 (West 2001 & Stipp. 2006).
57 Gerald L. Maatman, jr., Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report: Significant Fed-
eral Employment Discrimination Litigation and EEOC Pattern or Practice Rulings, 58 LAB. L.J. 53,
56 (2007); see Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000); Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
92 U.S.C. -§ 2000e (2000).
55 Oversight of the Civil Rights Division: Hearing before the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong.
(2006) (statement of Joseph Rich, Director of Fair Housing and Community Development,
Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law), available at Intp://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfm?id=2434&wit_id=5849. As Joseph Rich explained:
Since the beginning of the Bush Administration, 34 Title VII cases have been
filed, of which ten are pattern or practice cases, the most important employ-
ment discrimination cases brought by the Department (of justice] both in
their impact and complexity. Only two of the pattern or practice cases
brought by the [Civil Rights] Division allege discrimination against African-
Americans and these were not filed until February and July, 2006, more than
five years into the Bush Administration and after considerable attention had
been brought to the failure to bring such cases. In its first two years alone, the
Clinton Administration filed thirteen pattern or practice cases, eight of which
376	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 49:367
temic Task Force that developed recommendations published in early
2006, of ways to enhance the EEOC's role in combating systemic dis-
crimination, which it defines as "pattern or practice, policy and/or class
cases where the alleged discrimination has a broad impact on an
industry, profession, company, or geographic location." 59 Given the
EEOC's new systemic litigation initiative, the number of pattern or
practice lawsuits may rise in the future. 60
Most lawsuits, and particularly complex cases, settle anyway, and
this trend toward settlement is likely to increase. If certified as class
actions, these cases have a much greater likelihood of settling. 61 One
estimate from the Federal Judicial Center is that only three to six per-
cent of all class action lawsuits are tried—and that fraction is smaller
still for employment discrimination class actions. 62 The already large
number of suits that settle may be increased by several changes in sub-
stantive and procedural law. 63
raised race discrimination claims. Moreover, two of the ten employment pat-
tern or practice filings—filed before the recent cases alleging discrimination
against African-Americans—are "reverse" discrimination cases, alleging dis-
crimination against whites.
Id.
59 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, SYSTEMIC TASK FORCE REPORT" TO
THE CHAIR Or THE EQUAL. EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 1 (2006), available at
lutp://wwweeoc.gov/abouteeocitask_reports/systemic.html . The plans include hiring
additional experts to help identify systemic discrimination and litigation support person-
nel to address it, coordinating with other federal agencies to bring complex litigation, and
nationalizing systemic litigation by assisting held offices that will have primary responsibili-
ties for handling suits. The EEOC can litigate pattern or practice cases—the equivalent of
private class actions—without meeting the Rule 23 requirements for class certification. See
Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 446 U.S. 318, 320
(1980).
60 Press Release, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Third Annual Workplace Class Action Report from
Seyfarth Shaw of 2006 Collective Action Litigation Defines Trends for 2007 ( Jan. 22, 2007),
lutp://www.seyfitrth.com/index.cfin/fuseaction/news_pub.news_pub_detail/object_id/  1
bde952d-9df1-41e2-a3ae-ab710e12ad63/ThirdAnnualWorkplaceClassActionReportfromSey
farthShawof2006CaectiveAction LitigationDefinesTrendsfor2007.cfin.
61 One statistic comes from "[aJ 2005 study by the Federal Judicial Center of class ac-
tions filed in or removed to federal court ... between ... 1999 and ... 2002" —it "found
that 89 percent of the cases in which class certification was granted settled" and noted that
"44 percent of all of the cases, including those not certified, settled." Charles 13. Casper,
The Class Action Fairness Act's Impact on Settlements, 20 ANTITRUST 26, 26 (2005) (citing
THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, AN EMPIRICAL. EXAMINATION or ATTOR-
NEYS' CHOICE or FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 50, tb1.19 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 2005)).
62 THOMAS E. Wn.t.oiNG, El Al.., EMPIRICAL STUDY OP CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FED-
ERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL. REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL. RULES 167,
tbl.l6 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1996).
63 See Hart, supra note 32, at 375 (on excessive subjectivity theory); Martha Minow,
judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97
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A confluence of several factors is driving the increasing inclina-
tions toward settlement of large employment discrimination class ac-
tions as well as a focus on equitable relief. These factors include new
theories of relief with company-wide consequences, procedural barri-
ers to bringing Rule 23(b) (2) damage claims, and the recognition of
greater managerial activism on the part of federal judges that prompts
corporations to enter into consent decrees. 64
As with any litigation, the underlying substantive law shapes the
contours of these class action suits. In particular, class action employ-
ment discrimination suits reflect a significant, recently developed
theory in employment law: the idea of liability for excessive subjectiv-
ity in employment practices. 65 If courts accept this theory, it permits
sweeping challenges to company-wide practices and makes class law-
suits more likely. Claims alleging excessively subjective decisions pose
difficult issues, however, when it comes to class certification. The na-
ture of a claim of subjective hiring procedures is inevitably in tension
with the class requirements of commonality and predominance.° The
discriminatory "practice" is said to be subjective and discriminatory
decision making, and thus liability would be based on the absence of
company-wide standards for hiring, promotion, or compensation. The
argument, in short, is that decision making about employees is too in-
dividualized and subjective. That makes it difficult to contend that such
claims should be handled as class actions, for which common issues
must predominate. A number of courts thus have found that claims of
excessive subjectivity do not satisfy the class certification require-
ments, as such claims are based essentially on the absence of com-
monality, and individual issues will predominates' This certification
Comm. L. Rim 2010, 2010 (19J7) (using Judge Jack Weinstein as an example of manage-
rial activism on the part of federal judges); Linda S. Mullenix, No Exit: Mandatory Class
Actions in the New Millennium and the Blurring of Categorical Imperatives, 2003 U. CHL LEGAL F.
177, 215 (on procedural harriers to bringing 23(b) (2) damage claims).
64 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
65 See Hart, supra note 32, at 375.
66 See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
67 Compare Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1999)
(permitting class certification), Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 151 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (finding sufficient commonality), and McReynolds v. Sodexho Marriott Set- vs.,
Inc., 208 F.R.D. 428, 430 (D.D.C. 2002) (permitting class certification), with Gutierrez v.
Johnson & Johnson, 467 F. Stipp. 2d 403, 411-13 (D.NJ. 2006) (denying class certifica-
tion), and Colindres v. Quietflex Mfg. Co., 235 F.R.D. 347, 377-79 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (deny-
ing claim for classwide punitive damages). Regarding remedies for excessive subjectivity,
see Hart, supra note 24, at 1635-48.
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issue will make it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring class claims and
will nudge them toward settlement.
A prominent procedural issue that seems to be funneling large
employment cases toward structural settlements is the difficulty of
bringing Rule 23(b) (2) class claims for damages. Typically plaintiffs
prefer class certification under this Rule because that path does not
entail the expense of giving class members the notice of their rights to
opt out required when pursuing monetary damages claims under Rule
23(b) (3). 68
 Although the circuits are split, the growing consensus is that
23(b) (2) certification is appropriate only when monetary damages are
incidental to equitable relief. 69
 Claims for compensatory damages are
inappropriate for 23(b)(2) certification because the individual claims
predominate over the request for declaratory or injunctive relief.m
The class certification decision is pivotal for plaintiffs who are
trying to leverage substantial settlements. The difficulties of proving
large-scale cases of excessive subjectivity while obtaining class certifica-
tion, coupled with the barrier to pursuing Rule 23(b) (2) damages
class actions, .have moved plaintiffs toward an emphasis on settlements
in which defendants promise institutional reform." For example, the
primary goal in the current litigation against Wal-Mart is not damages
but transformation of the company's treatment of employees. 72 In-
deed, the Wal-Mart plaintiffs seek "class-wide injunctive and declara-
68
 See Mullenix, supra note 63, at 215.
69 See, e.g., Reeb v. Ohio Dep'i of Rehab. & Corr., 435 F.3d 639, 651 (6th Cir. 2006);
Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3(1 695, 702 (11th Cir. 2004); Monreal v. Potter, 367 F.3d 1224, 1226
(10th Cir. 2004); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 1998); Miller
V. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 202 ER.D. 195, 198 (D. Md. 2001); Augustin v. jablonsky, No.
99CV3126(DRH) (ARL), 2001 WL 770839, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2001); Bacon v. Honda
of Am. Mfg., Inc., 205 F.R.D. 466, 479 (S.D. Ohio 2001); Ramirez v. DeCoster, 194 F.R.D.
348, 351 (D. Me. 2000); see also Ticor Tide Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 121 (1994)
(mentioning the 'substantial possibility" that money damages class actions are only appro-
priate for certification under Rule 23(b) (3)). But see Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 942
(91.11 Cir. 2003); Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 162-63 (2d Cir.
2001).
711
 Reeb, 435 F.3d at 641.
71 See, e.g., Haynes v. Slioney's, Inc., No. 89-30093-RV, 1993 WL 19915, at *20 (N.D. Fla.
Jan. 25, 1993).
72 Steven Greenhouse & Constance L. Hays, Wal-Mart Sex-Bias Suit Given Class-Action
Status, N.Y. T/N1ES, June 23, 2004, at Al ("'Our clients got into this seeking to change the
way they do business.... We would never settle for . just money.'" (quoting plaintiffs' attor-
ney Joe Sellers)); see Robert Fisher, Note, Dukes v. Wal-Mart: Can 1.5 Million Women Save
Employment Discrimination Class Actions?, 12 CARoozo J.L. & GENDER 1009, 1030 (2006).
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tory relief, lost pay, and punitive damages. They do not seek any com-
pensatory damages on behalf of the class." 73
Related factors influencing the movement toward structural relief
in employment class litigation are the increasing sophistication of
plaintiffs' counsel, the development of public interest organizations
committed to impact litigation, and the use of labor organizing strate-
gies in conducting litigation and marshalling accompanying press. 74
The last decade has witnessed an evolution frOm cases brought by indi-
vidual and isolated plaintiffs' counsel to repeat players as lead counsel
for plaintiffs' classes,75 as well as class actions supported by advocacy
organizations that amass foundational support for litigation and offer
financial support, technical expertise, and litigation assistance in com-
plex employment discrimination cases. 76 The expertise helps channel
employment discrimination cases to consent decrees because plaintiffs'
counsel want to avoid the expenses of a mammoth trial and have the
experience in structuring favorable settlements."
In short, the nature of employment discrimination class action
lawsuits is changing. A variety of procedural, substantive, and expertise
reasons are routing these cases toward consent decrees.
H. CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS AS VEHICLES FOR STRUCTURAL REFORM
Long before theorists began noticing that the large-scale remedies
required in class action lawsuits had the power to restructure the work-
place, class actions were transforming other social institutions, such as
73 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 141.
" See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
75 See, e.g., David Streitfekl, It Berkeley vs. Bentonville as Lawyers Take on Wil-Mart, L.A.
Tuffs, June 28, 2004, at Al. For example, Cyrus Mehri, a Strashington, D.C. attorney, served as
class counsel in both the Texaco and Coca-Cola cases. Mehri Skalet PLLC, Cyrus Mehri,
lutp://web2.customwebexpress.com/meska/sub/cp-us-mehrijsp (last visited Feb.27, 2008).
Barry Goldstein was a lawyer for the plaintiffs in the Home Depot and Shoney's litigation. Anna
Oberthur, The justice Files: Three Legal Pros Make a Difference, OALANO, Man 2007, available at
http://wwwmildancuagazine.com /media /Oakland-Mag-azine /March-2007/The-Justice-Files.
76 Fisher, supra note 72, at 1024-25 (discussing public organizations such as The Impact
Fund and the Equal Rights Advocates). In the Wal-Mart suit, three nonprofit advocacy
groups, the Impact Fund, Equal Rights Advocates, and the Public Justice Center, worked with
plaintiffs' counsel. Wal-Mart Class Website, Attorney Profiles, lutp://wwwwalmartclass.com/
public_attorneyprofiles.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
77 See Oberthur, supra note 75; see also Shima Baradaran-Robison, Comment, Kaleido-
scopic Consent Decrees: School Desegregation and Prison Reform Consent Decrees After the Prison
Litigation Reform Act and Freeman-Dowell, 2003 BYU L. Rt:v. 1333, 1339-41 (discussing
three general incentives for entering into consent decrees: the flexibility of judicial over-
sight, the broader relief available, and the benefits of avoiding litigation).
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schools and prisons." The theoretical predicate emerged from Harry
Kalven and Maurice Rosenfeld's seminal article on the class action pro-
cedural device as "an effective means of group redress" to supplement
administrative enforcement efforts." The practical inspiration for col-
lective public interest litigation was, of course, the 1954 Supreme Court
decision in Brown v. Board of Education. 8° In Professor Stephen Yeazell's
words, "Brown changed everything."" What Brown demonstrated for
litigants was that "a carefully designed litigation strategy, supported by
modest resources, could remake the social landscape. "82
Forward-looking judges were also pivotal in the history of civil
rights enforcement. A number of federal judges, "unlikely heroes,"
undertook innovative efforts to address the sweeping problems of seg-
regation during the civil rights battles of the 1950s and 1960s. 88 As
examples of these rulings, Alabama Federal District Judge Frank M.
Johnson. Ir.. certified two defendant classes of Alabama officials to
desegregate prisons and detention facilities," eliminated the literacy
reouirements used by local voter registration boards to reduce the
number of blacks voting. 85 and declared unconstitutional the segre-
gated bus system in Montgomery. 86 Judge John Minor Wisdom on the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a comprehensive school
desegregation opinion, put forward the position that Brown mandated
more than the elimination of de lure see-regation—it meant the obli-
gation of states to "furnish ... fully integrated education."87
In New Orleans, despite state officials' promised resistance, Fed-
eral District Judge Skelly Wright insisted on desegregation in accor-
78 Maimon Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the
Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 887,
78 Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfeld, The Contemporary' Function of the Class Suit, 8 U.
Cut. L. REV. 684, 687 (1941). For a discussion of the influence of Kalven and Rosenfeld's
concepts, see Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent Litigation
Revolution, 57 VAND. L. Rev. 1975, 1978-79 (2004).
80 See generally 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Yeazell, supra note 79, at 1981.
82 Id.
83 See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981).
84 See Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Stipp. 327, 333 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (desegregating deten-
tion facilities and prisons in Alabama), affil per curiam, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
e5 STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1069, at
268 (1976) .
88 JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM; THE: LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON,
JR., AND THE FIGHT OVER CIVIL. RIGI Yrs 11 I (1993).
87 United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 846 (5th Cir. 1966).
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dance with the Supreme Court's mandate of "all deliberate speed."sa
When • these judges courageously insisted on rights for despised mi-
norities, they faced majoritarian hostility:
By the end of 1960, Skelly Wright had become the most hated
man in New Orleans. Pairs of federal marshals alternated in
eight-hour shifts at his home to ensure his physical safety, and
they escorted him to and from work. With few exceptions, old
friends would step across the street to avoid speaking to him."
More recent examples include William Wayne Justice, a federal
district judge in Texas who became instrumental in bringing about
prison reform through court oversight." In the early 1970s, Judge Jus-
tice consolidated a number of individual pro se prisoner petitions and
ultimately certified a class of over 30,000 inmates (confined in various
different facilities) that, in 1980, became the legendary prison condi-
tions case Ruiz v. Eseelle.91 He found a number of aspects of the Texas
prison system unconstitutional—the perpetual overcrowding; brutal-
ity, including egregious methods of discipline; and systematic inatten-
tion to prisoners' medical conditions. 92 The judge ordered the United
States to participate in assisting prisoners with litigation because they
were outlawyered by the Texas Department of Corrections." Then he
appointed special masters to oversee the implementation of his in-
junctive orders that, among other things, required a specific amount
of square feet of space per inmate in dormitories, mandated that the
Department of Corrections keep records of disciplinary hearings, and
compelled adequate exercise opportunities for inmates."
Although the district court entered a final judgment on a consent
decree in 1992, Judge Justice retained jurisdiction over eight areas of
88 Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 138 F. Supp. 337, 342 (E.D. La. 1956), aff'd, 242.
F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957).
89 BASS, supra note 86, at 115; see also William Wayne Justice, The Two Faces ofjudicial Ac-
tivism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992) (observing that his "name was on the 'tell most
wanted' list of judicial activists for much of [his] nearly quarter-century on the bench").
90 William Wayne Justice, The Origins of Ruiz v. Estelle. , 43 STAN. L. REv. 1, 1 (1990);
Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study ()Hail and Prison Court Or-
ders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 614 (2006).
91 See generally Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F, Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affil in part, vacated in
part, and modified in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982); see Justice, supra note 90, at 1;
Schlanger, supra note 90, at 614.
92
 justice, supra note 89, at 9.
9' Justice, supra note 90, at 10 ("The prisoners had ... no earthly idea of how to pre-
sent their contentions in a legally significant way.").
Ruiz, 503 F. Supp. at 1389-90.
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prison conditions, such as overcrowding. 95
 In 2001, almost thirty years
after the inception of the lawsuit, the court continued to exercise
oversight over three areas where deplorable conditions persisted: the
"conditions of confinement in administrative segregation, the failure
to provide reasonable safety to inmates against assault and abuse, and
the excessive use of force by correctional officers in Texas prisons,"
where, the court noted, "today's prisoners remain victims of an un-
constitutional system.""
Ruiz and other prison cases, such as the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama's 1976 decision in Pugh v. Locke 97 and the
U.S. Supreme Court's 1979 decision in Bell v. Wolftsh,98 represented a
sweeping change from individual complaints about instances of pris-
oner maltreatment to a movement of institutional reform through liti-
gation that contested the entire system of prison conditions. They also
envisioned an entirely different conception of the role of the judiciary.
These complex cases, with judges engaged in managerial activ-
ism, are not just relics of the civil rights era. In the early 1980s, Chief
Judge Jack Weinstein of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York. presided over the settlement of the Agent Orange litiga-
tion." This was a landmark class action suit against Dow, Monsanto,
and other manufacturers of the herbicide dioxin brought by Vietnam
veterans who alleged that these defoliants caused various types of can-
cers and genetic and birth defects in soldiers and their children.'"
Judge Weinstein made a number of rulings that nudged the parties
toward settlement.m He brought the U.S. government into the case
on an indemnity theory, revealed how he might rule on a number of
legal issues by making tentative or preliminary findings, hired a set-
tlement consultant, then appointed several special masters to facilitate
the settlement, and finally conducted an "around-the-clock negotiat-
ing marathon" to settle the case. 102 At the time, it was the largest per-
sonal injury settlement in history, with a class of 2.4 million Vietnam
veterans and their wives and children, a fund of over $200 million, a
95 Ruiz c. Estelle, 161 F.3(1 814, 816 (5th Or. 1998).
96
 Ruiz v. Johnson, 154 F. Supp, 2d 975, 1001 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
97 See generally 406 F. Stipp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
914 See prneralk 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
99 See generally In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y.
1984), affd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
100 Id. at 746.
1 ° 1 Peter H. Schack, The Role of fudges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example,
53 Li. Cm. L. REV. 337, 344-45 (1986).
102 Id.
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settlement and distribution plan, and a judicially constructed com-
plex administrative structure to process claims. 103
Judge Weinstein used similar techniques when he presided over as-
bestos, diethylstilbestrol ("DES"), handgun, and tobacco cases. 104 Some
of Judge Weinstein's critics disapproved of the activism. of his interven-
tion. 105 But his supporters and detractors agree that Judge Weinstein's
commitment of judicial resources and active intervention were crucial to
the settlement of the case.106 In Professor Martha Minow's words,
'Through his bold personal transcendence of the traditional role of the
judge, Weinstein has attempted to fashion global resolutions to multi-
jurisdictional conflicts ....'' 107
Judge Weinstein is not alone in striving toward more comprehen-
sive settlements of high stakes, multiple-party complex litigation
103 See id. at 341; Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts in an Age of Equity Procedure: Re-
defining Appellate Review for the Mass Tort Era, 80 N.C. L. REV. 527, 547 (2002). The distribu-
tion included a later-reversed distribution of settlement proceeds to an independent foun-
dation without court oversight to provide veterans' assistance services to the class. See In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 179, 185-86 (2d Cir. 1987), aff'g in part, rev'g in
part 611 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). Judge Weinstein's Agent Orange compensation
system has had enduring influence, serving as a model for the compensation fund for
September 11th victims. See Elizabeth Berkowitz, The Problematic Role of the Special Master:
Undermining the Legitimacy of the September I I th Victim Compensation Fund, 24 YALE L. & Pot.' v
REV. 1, 23 (2006).
104 See generally Scott Fruehwald, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation: Judge Jack B.
Weinstein on Choice of Law in Mass Tort Cases. 31 HOESTRA L. REV. 323 (20021.
105 See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litigation: Paradigm Misplaced, 88
Nw. U. L. REv. 579, 590 (1994). Linda Mullenix argues:
Judge Weinstein's overarching theory of judicial power is even more disturbing
than his superficial treatment of the problems of managerial judging. Again, to
his credit, Judge Weinstein simply and forthrightly dismisses the notion that
judges should clothe themselves with any mantle of neutrality or impartiality.
Judge Weinstein believes that judges ought to be biased, feeling, involved, opin-
ionated, and result oriented.... hum this debate [over judicial power], .Judge
Wetnstein sails off the end of the known universe. Judge Weinstein would trans-
form judges into legislators, community workers, ministers, evangelists, adminis-
trative bureaucrats, and executive branch policymakers.
Id.; see also id. at 579 11.3 (citing Benchmark, NEW YORKER, May 3, 1993, at 36 (calling judge
Weinstein "Orrin Hatch's worst nightmare—the apotheosis of the liberal activist judge")).
See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HAM'. L. REV. 374 (1982). The activist
critique may be one that Judge Weinstein would embrace, as he "believes that an activist
government plays a legitimate role in fostering the trust necessary to break out of collec-
tively self-defeating pursuits of individual interests." David Lubati, Heroic Judging in an Anti-
heroic Age, 97 CoLukt. L. REV. 2064. 2076 (19971.
106 See, e.g., Schack, supra note 101, at 348 ("According to virtually all of the lawyers
who participated in the negotiation of the Agent Orange settlement, Judge Weinstein's
distinctive intervention was essential to the settlement.").
1 07 Minow, supra note 63, at 2010.
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through alternative dispute resolution methods. 108 Indeed, these
"megacases" have forced an expansion in the role of the judge from
simply presiding over traditional litigation to more active participa-
tion in mediating global solutions. ] °9 Rule 23 itself foresees a more
involved role for the judge in, for instance, the requirement of ap-
proval of settlement agreements."°
One feature that has both encouraged and assisted with greater
judicial oversight of complex cases has been the rise in the use of ju-
dicial surrogates)" Judges, particularly in the past two decades, have
increasingly turned to compliance monitors such as special masters or
independent supervisors to assure fulfillment of their orders. 1 i 2 Law-
suits in contexts outside of employment—such as those concerning
antitrust, child welfare and foster care, treatment of inmates in men-
tal hospitals, and questionable police practice cases—have created
external monitoring structures ranging from corporate boards to ci-
vilian review boards to avenues for plaintiffs to report back to the
court. 115 Again, in other contexts, courts have also experimented with
special masters. magistrates. or iudicial adjuncts to oversee implemen-
tation of settlement agreements)"
Despite the rise of greater activism in case management among
judges, particularly in civil rights and mass tort cases as detailed above,
for the most part they do not like to extend themselves in projects of
continuing oversight because they have few enforcement tools and
100 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. Rev.
1281, 1281 (1976).
109 See, e.g., Eric D. Green, ReExamining Mediator and Judicial Roles in Large, Complex Liti-
gation: Lessons from Microsoft and Other Megacases, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1171 (2006).
110 See FED. R. Cm P. 23(e) (1) (A).
111 See Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the
Search fin. an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1197 (2005).
112 see. a
112 Martin Guggenheim, State-Supported Foster Care: The Interplay Between the Prohibition of
Establishing Religion and the Free Exercise Rights of Parents and Children: Wilder v. Bernstein, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 603, 626 (1990); Sean Hecker; Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded
Role for Civilian Review Board, 28 COLUM. Hun. RTS. L. REV. 551, 561-62 (1997); Marcia
Robinson Lowry, 14,7iy Settle Wien You Can Win: Institutional Reform and Marisol v. Giuliani,
26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1335, 1346 (1999); Brad H. v. City of New York: Inmates at Hospitals'
Forensic Units Are Covered by Settlement Providing Discharge Planning, N.Y.L,J., Apr. 22, 2005, at
19; Kathleen A. Macon at al., Competition Litigation in Telecommunications in 2004 and Beyond:
An Overview of Antitrust, Predatory Pricing, Competitive Access, Overbuilds, and Other Competitive
Issues 92 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop., Course Handbook
Series No. G0-01GH. 2003), WI, 778 PLI/Pat 9.
114 See, e.g., Linda J. Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc Pro-
cedure, 137 U. PA. L. Rev. 2131, 2170 n.193 (1989).
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overambitious oversight projects diminish the power of the court." 5
Absent the direct supervision of judges, one development of the past
decade has been the turn toward independent settlement monitors." 6
The next Part addresses the evolution of judicial monitoring and other
innovations in the implementation of employment discrimination class
action consent decrees." 7
III. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS AND
THE REFORM OF WORKPLACE CULTURES
Employment discrimination class action suits settled in the early to.
mid-1990s emphasized monetary relief, and plaintiffs seemed mini-
mally interested in structural remedies.' 18 In the early years of employ-
ment discrimination class action settlements, courts left it to defendants
to report to plaintiffs about their implementation of remedial struc-
tures.ilg Class attorneys, having received fees, retained little incentive to
monitor corporate behavior or mount a follow-up action. Individual
plaintiffs, whose stake typically are small, had limited motivation to su-
pervise the attorneys and lacked resources and ability to ensure corpo-
rate compliance. 120
During the 1990s, courts varied between compelling defendants to
report to plaintiffs' counsel about progress with compliance, 121 mandat-
ing defendants to develop internal structures for equal employment
115 See generally Chayes, supra note 108.
116 See Kessler, supra note I 1 1, at 1197.
117 See infra notes 118-407 and accompanying text.
118 See Lynne Duke, Shoney's Bias Settlement Sends $105 Million Signal, WASH. POST, Feb.
3, 1993, at Al; Philip linger, State Farm to Pay Women $157 Million for Job Bias, L.A. Tims,
Apr. 29. 1992, at Al.
118 See, e.g., Haynes v. Shoney's, Inc., No. 89-30093-RV, 1993 NYL 19915, at *21, 23 (N.D.
Fla. Jan. 25, 1993) (requiring defendants to submit quarterly progress reports to plaintiffs'
class counsel).
1" See, e.g., John C. Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Share-
holder Litigation, LAW & CONTENIP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 6; Sylvia R. Lazos, Note, Abuse
in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a Guardian Daring Pretrial Settlement Negotia-
tions, 84 Mien. L. REV. 308, 319 (1985).
121 See, e.g., Haynes, 1993 MIL 19915, at *20 (approving a consent decree establishing a
$105 million settlement fund for race discrimination suit); see also Michael Selmi, The Price
of Discrimination: The Nature of Glass Action Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects,
81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1325 (2003) ("During the four years it was under a consent decree.
Home Depot appears to have filed only one progress report, which provided no data and
which the plaintiffs' attorneys summarily approved with the conclusory statement that the
numbers were better than before.").
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opportunity monitoring, 122
 more recently requiring members of de-
fendants' senior management to oversee human resources to ensure
compliance with the consent decree,'" or some combination of the
foregoing. Most judges were interested in disposing of cases before
them and had limited interest in, or resources available for, continual
monitoring of settlement irnplementation. 124
The past decade has witnessed an evolution in the contours of
employment discrimination class action settlements. Some of the ear-
lier settlements focused on monetary relief, whereas the later ones
emphasize structural changes in workplace policies. 125
 Professor Tris-
tin Green made the point that class treatment of claims and class-wide
relief can change the nature of the workplace by dismantling dis-
criminatory organizational structures. 126
 One feature of recent behe-
moth class action settlements has been an emphasis on establishing
structures, primarily in the form of task forces, charged with supervi-
sory responsibilities to help monitor the implementation of settle-
ments. 127
 Companies settling cases in the early to mid-1990s seemed
more interested in publicity correctives than in creating foundational
changes in employment practices and procedures.'" Judges responsi-
ble for approving consent decrees seemed increasingly willing to en-
gage in some form of extended court oversight, either themselves or
through judicial surrogates.' 29
"2
 Haynes, 1993 WI. 19915, at *20-25; see infra notes 335-338 and accompanying text
(discussing Mitsubishi's separate equal employment opportunity structure called the Op-
portunity Programs Department).
Haynes, 1993 WI. 19915, at *6; see also, e.g., Astor v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., Nos. 0051093,
CO51352, 2007 I'M 184741, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2007) (noting that the defendant
hired a "Senior Vice President in charge of !Inman resources to enforce the consent decree
and to develop a 'professional' human resources function as required by the decree").
124 See LttlAus, supra note 105, at 2082; see also Lawrence M. Ginsberg, Class Actions and
Client-Centered Decisionmaking, 40 SYRACUSE L. REv. 709, 739 (1989) ("[MJost class settle-
ments get approved with little objection and generally little judicial involvement.").
125
 Dorothy J. Gaiter, Eating Crow: How Shoney's, Belted by a Lawsuit, Found the Path to Di-
versity, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 16, 1996, at B4 ($132.5 million settlement in lawsuit against
Shoney's, filed in 1989); Tammy Joyner janita Poe, Coke Settlement Sets New Standards for
Corporations, ATLANTA j.-CoNsT., Nov. 19, 2000, at 1 (noting that structural reforms were
key to the 2000 Coca-Cola settlement).
126 Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for Institutional Reform,
72 FORDHAM L. REv. 659, 709-10 (2003).
127 See Joyner & Poe, supra note 125,
126 See Darryl Van Duch, Bad PR Spurs Cave-ins: Some Companies Are Settling to Contain
Harm from Negative Publicity, NAT'L 1.j., Oct. 13, 1997, at A1.
129 See Kessler; supra note 111, at 1197.
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This Part first examines several representative settlements of large
employment discrimination class action suits—the cases against
Shoney's, Texaco, Home Depot, Mitsubishi, and Coca-Cola)3° Next, it
evaluates the ways in which consent decrees have changed over time
and the lessons learned from the implementation of these settle-
ments)" No case is a perfect example of any specific theme, but viewed
together they present a picture of cases building on each other.
A. The Evolution of Consent Decrees
1. The Early 1990s: Shoney's
One of the early and highly visible employment discrimination
class action suits was filed against Shoney's in 1989. 132 It included alle-
gations of widespread sexual harassment and race discrimination) 33
The plaintiffs recounted numerous instances in which Raymond
Danner, the company's founder, CEO, and principal shareholder,
made it clear to his managers he did not want black employees,
thought having blacks working in his stores would turn away white
customers, and used ghastly racial slurs)" Literature professor Steve
Watkins has written a history of the suit in The Black 0: Racism and Re-
demption in an American Corporate Empire. 135 The title of the book comes
from evidence that emerged during the lawsuit white managers testi-
fied in depositions that they were directed to blacken in the letter "0"
in Shoney's on employment applications from African Americans so
that those forms could later be easily identified and discarded.' 56
 If
black applicants were hired, they were routed to kitchen jobs and
away from management)" An executive at Shoney's said that Danner
had talked about making a contribution to the Ku Klux Klatt, "saying,
`Those guys are really right.'" 38 Ultimately the consent decree cov-
130 See infra notes 132-263 and accompanying text.
13 ' See infra notes 264-407 and accompanying text.
132 See Michelle Hiskey, Sad: Shoney's Franchisee Keeps Blacks in Kitchens, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Oct. 12,1989, at Bl,
133 Haynes, 1992 WL 752127, at I.
124 STEVE WATKINS, THE BLACK 0: RACISM AND REDEMIMUN IN AN AMERICAN CORPO-
RATE EMPIRE 30,215-22 (1997).
123 See ginerally id.
"6 Id. at 5.
137 See Editorial, Paying the Price for Discriminating, BALT. SUN, Dec. 23,1992, at 12A.
138 Id.
388	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol 49:367
ered 200,000 current and former employees and job applicants in
twenty-three states. 139
The cash portion of the $132.5 million settlement provided $105
million for over 20,000 individual class members to be allocated accord-
ing to a formula depending on whether the member was an applicant
or current or former employee, the number of incidents of discrimina-
tion, and when they occurred."° Equitable relief included the ap-
pointment of a new senior management official to supervise human
resources, two equal employment opportunity managers, and two re-
cruitment administrators; the adoption of grievance and disciplinary
procedures, hiring and promotion goals, and training programs; the
creation of a tuition reimbursement program to encourage continuing
education; and the establishment of job qualification and performance
standards to ensure fair employment practices.' 41 Shoney's also adopted
an affirmative action plan. The decree required defendants to submit
quarterly progress reports to plaintiffs' class counsel.t 42
The magnitude of the Shoney's settlement was substantial relative
to the size of the company, caused the chain to post an earnings loss of
$26.6 million in 1992, and prompted the company to spend almost
$200 million over a four-year period on salaries and contracts with mi-
nority vendors to mend its reputation. 143 One of the implementation
mechanisms Shoney's adopted was to tie management bonuses to the
diversity objectives in the consent decree. By 1997, African Americans
constituted 21% of Shoney's managers (compared to 14.5% when the
suit was filed in 1989) and 35% of the entire workforce (up from 28%
in 1989). 144 The decree was to remain in effect for ten years,' 45 but the
decree allowed Shoney's to petition the court for termination of its
oversight after seven years—which the company successfully did.' 46
09 Haynes, 1993 WL 19915, at *7; Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimina-
tion, 101 CoLum. L REv. 458, 463 n.367 (2001).
140 Gaiter, supra note 125.
141 See generally Haynes, 1993 WL 19915.
141 Id. at *21, 23.
145 An attorney for Shoney's shareholders calculated the 1995 revenues of both Texaco
and Shoney's and estimated that "a comparable settlement for Texaco would have cost
approximately $4.5 billion as compared to the $176 million it actually paid." Michelle
McCann, Note, Shareholder Proposal Rule: Cracker Barrel in Light of Texaco, 39 B.C. L. REv.
965, 968 n.37 (1998).
144 L.A. Winokur, Shoney's Progress Noted Since Settlement, ATLANTA J.-CoNsT., Nov. 16,
1997.
145 Haynes, 1993	 19915, at *14.
146 E-mail front Barry Goldstein, Attorney, Goldstein, Demchack, Ballet; Borgen
Dardarian, to Lawrence MacLachlan, Director or Research & Instructional Services, lini-
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The lawsuit seemed to encourage changes in a company steeped in
a culture of Southern apartheid. At the time the lawsuit was filed, the
average age of the members of the board of directors was seventy-two. 147
As the lawsuit was underway, Danner stepped down as chairman; his
successor j. Mitchell Boyd issued an apology backed by a commitment to
send millions of dollars worth of business to minority contractors.'" As
one newspaper noted: "Even before settling the suit, Shoney's struck a
voluntary covenant with the Southern Christian Leadership Confer-
ence. Since then, the company has pumped more than $194 million-
26 percent more than its goals—into minority-owned companies and
organizations, and into black employees' salaries."'"
Shoney's quickly became one of Fortune Magazine's top fifty com-
panies for minorities by 1998, registering as thirteenth out of the fifty
best companies in the country for diversity hiring. promotion. and re-
tention. 150 But the next year, the company had dropped to thirty-ninth
out of fifty: when the bottom-line flattened out, seemingly so did
Shoney's commitment to diversity. 151 Shoney's ranked thirty-sixth out of
fifty in 2000, 152 but was missing from the list in 2002, 2004, and 2006.' 53
versity of Missouri Kansas City School of Law (May 15, 2007, 5:23 PM) (on file with au-
thor).
'47 Dorothy J. Gaiter, A Commitment to Workplace Diversity, ATLANTA I-CONST., Apr. 17,.
1996, at D2.
148 Id.
-	 149 Id.
150 Li xandra Urresta & Jonathan Hickman, The Diversity Elite, FORTUNE, Aug. 3, 1998, at
H4 ("After a $135 million discrimination settlement, minorities account for 30% of the
restaurant chain's managers, and Shoney's has cone from diversity sinner to winner.").
151 Edward Robinson & Jonathan Hickman, The Diversity Elite, FORTUNE, JnIy 19, 1999, avail-
able at hup://money.cnn.com/magazines/ fortune/forttme_archive/1999/07/ 19/263120/
index.htm ("Diversity took a back table to financial travails at Shoney's last year. The company
lost $107.7 million in 1998, and first-quarter revenues were down 12%. Shoney's added just one
minority franchisee in '98.").
152 Christine Y. Chen & Jonathan Hickman, America's 50 Best Companies for Minorities,
FORTUNE, July 10, 2000, available at http://money,cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_
arch ive/ 2000/07/ I0/283788/index.htm.
153 See 100 Best Companies to Work fin-, Minorities, CNNMoNEv.com , http://money.enn.
co► /magazines/fortune/bestcompanies/minorities (last visited Feb. '28, 2008) (2006 list);
Cora Daniels et al., 50 Best Companies for Minorities, FORTUNE, June 28, 2004, available at
'mix/ / money.cn n.com/magazines/fortune/fo  rtu ne_arch ive/ 2004/06/28/374393/i ndex.
htm; Jonathan Hickman, America's 50 Best C077panie fin' Minorities, FORTUNE, July 8, 2002, available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazincs/fortune/forume_archive/2002/07/08/32585 4/index. hum.
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2. Texaco
In 1996, two managerial-level employees of Texaco in New York
sued the company alleging that it systematically favored less experi-
enced white employees over blacks in pay. Promotions. and iob oppor-
tunities, and created a racially hostile work environment. 154 One of the
lead plaintiffs, Bari-Ellen Roberts, said that executives downgraded her
Performance review because they said she was "uppity." subjected her
to other racial stereotypes, and passed her over for promotions.I 55
Other witnesses claimed that white emolovees and managers referred
to black employees as "niggers" and "porch monkeys."156 The plaintiffs
moved for class certification. but the Texaco case was settled before the
court heard arguments on the class certification motion. 157
The settlement was prompted by tapes released to the media that
allegedly contained racial slurs and a discussion of plans to destroy
documents regarding the lawsuit. 158 A senior finance department staffer
surreptitiously tape-recorded executives calling African-American work-
ers "black jelly beans," expressing resentment of Black History Month
and Kwanzaa celebrations, and talking about whether to destroy evi-
dence in the suit. 159 When the tapes were made public, they prompted a
blaze of adverse publicity and a threatened product boycott; within
weeks Texaco announced the $176 million settlement.'"
Following the release of the tapes and operating on a parallel track
to its settlement negotiations, Texaco "conducted an extraordinary in-
dependent internal investigation of its corporate culture by disbursing
six or seven executive team members to Texaco worksites" to gather
154 Roberts v, Texaco. Inc.. 979 F. Soon. 185. 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
155 BARI-ELLEN ROBERTS & JACK E. WHITE, ROBERTS V. TEXACO: A TRUE STORY or
RACE AND CORPORATE AMERICA 163-64 (1998).
156 Kurt Eichenwald, Texaco Executives, on Tape, Discussed Impeding Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4. 1996, at AI.
157 Texaco Signs Settlement in Race-Bias Suit: Plaintiffs' Lawyers Value Agreement at $176 Mil-
lion, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 16, 1996, at lA [hereinafter Texaco Signs Settlement in
Rare-Bias Suit] ("After dragging on for 2 1/2 years, the case was settled in 10 clays of urgent
negotiations that began Nov. 5, the day after the disclosure of secret tape recordings of
senior Texaco executives denigrating black workers and plotting to destroy incriminating
evidence in the lawsuit.").
158 Texaco Dues Right Thing, supra note '11.
159 Hanna Rosin, Cultural Revolution at Texaco, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 2, 1998, at 15, 16.
Compare Anne Fisher, Texaco: A Series of Racial Horror Stories, FORTUNE, May 11, 1998, at 186
("black jelly beans"), with Kurt Eichenwald, Investigation Finds No Evidence of Slur on Texaco
Tapes, N.Y. Timm. Nov. 11. 1996. at Al.
16° See infra notes 267-271 and accompanying text (discussing how the negative public-
ity prompted a rapid settlement).
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employees' perceptions.' 61 Texaco management also hired an esteemed
retired African-American federal judge, A. Leon Higginbotham, the
former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
to consult with Texaco on its internal review of its own corporate cul-
ture. 162 An important factor in the Texaco settlement and implementa-
tion process was the attitude of its recently appointed CEO Peter Bijur.
Once the tapes were released, Bijur realized he had a problem with sen-
ior management and in addition to "what most Task Force members
perceived as his own genuine humanitarian commitment to anti-
discrimination Policies, Bijur made equality and fairness a top man-
agement priority:no
The settlement provisions included a cash payment of $115 mil-
lion. including a one-time 11 % pay raise. to 1400 black employees who
were potential class plaintiffs.'" It also created an independent "Equal-
ity and Tolerance Task Force" to evaluate employment policies and
monitor workplace practices for five years. The task force members had
outstanding credentials and exceptional star firepower: former U.S.
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights and current Governor of
Massachusetts, Deval Patrick; retired Chiefititlge of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, John J. Gibbons; founding member of
Black Women's Agenda, Inc., Dr. Jeffalyn Johnson; retired director and
vice chairman of Texaco, Allen J. Krowe; law professor Mari Matsuda;
former Chair and CEO of United Press International. Luis Nogales;
and former Solicitor of Labor Thomas S. Williamson, Jr. 165 Two years
after the formation of the task force, Texaco asked one of its members,
Deval Patrick, to become the company's new general counsel and its
first black vice president.'" Texaco agreed to give the seven-member
task force essentially veto Power over human resources decisions and
implementation of the settlement goals. 167 Because of Texaco's proac-
tive efforts toward self-investigation, the task force collaborated with
151 CATHY CRONIN-HARRIS & DAVID M. WHITE, NEGOTIATING ENDURING CORPORATE
CHANGE: A CASE STUDY ON THE TASK FORCE ON EQUALITY AND FAIRNESS IN ROBERTS V.
ThAA co INC. 14 (2005).
10 Id. at 14-15.
163 Id. at 20.
164 Rosin, supra note 159, at 15.
165 The plaintiffs and the company each chose three members of the task force and
then agreed on a chair. When Deval Patrick became general counsel at Texaco, health care
management professor Dr. James Rosser succeeded him. CRONIN-HARRIS Sc WHITE, supra
note 161, at 21,47-54. The judge presiding over the Texaco litigation attended meetings
of the task force at times, Id. at 24.
166 Reuters. Texaco Names General Counsel. N.Y. Tams, Dec. t 8,1998, at C19.
167 CRONIN-HARRIS & WHITE, supra note 161, at 12.
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Judge Higginbotham and Texaco management to evaluate and re-
spond to (rather than. compel) some of the initiatives begun by the
company. 168
Texaco's task force was exceptionally well funded. The settlement
agreement provided a separate fund of $35 million to encompass all
task force activities—including compensating task force members, staff,
and experts—over the five-year Period. as well as Texaco's consultant
and staff time and expenses to implement program changes.' 69 It was
also notable for its level of engagement and oversight. The task force
held meetings lasting one to two days each month, conducted focus
groups to interview employees, met with company representatives, as-
sessed historical data from the company about its employment prac-
tices, and researched methods of benchmarking progress."° 'Mien
members of the task force talked to employees, they requested specific
information, such as, "What arc you appraising people for? How are
they informed of expectations?• How do your methods compare to
competitors' best practices in your own and other industries?"'"
The design of better practices took eighteen months before any
implementation began. and task force members assisted in educating
employees about the new procedures and policies. 172 The task force
issued annual reports that identified progress and areas that needed
improvement. Reviewers from the International Institute for Conflict
Prevention and Resolution pointed out that the very existence of the
task force and Texaco's obligation to report to the task force twice a
year forced the company to prioritize diversity)" The settlement also
committed the company to transparency. Under the terms of the de-
cree, for five years the EEOC could "monitor Texaco's compliance with
federal law that prohibits workplace discrimination by inspecting Tex-
aco's premises and records and interviewing current or former salaried
employees," and, each year, "Texaco must give the EEOC a report that
gives information about vacancies filled by promotion. For every va-
cancy filled, Texaco must describe the job opening, outside recruit-
168 Id. at 16.
169 Id. at 24.
17° Id. at 24-25.
171 Id. at 25.
179 CRONIN-HARRIS &	 supra note 161, at 25-26.
178 Id. at 22.
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ment notices, internal job posting and documentation of career lad-
ders."I 74
Another distinguishing feature of the Texaco settlement was that it
seemed to have company buy-in at the highest levels. Texaco made
commitments to remake its corporate culture. 175 Before the task force
even got underway, Texaco proactively announced its intent to change
policies. 176 Three weeks after announcing the settlement, CEO Peter
Bijur unveiled a complex proposal to diversify its workforce, including
pledges to boost minority employment, raise the number of minority
and female managers, increase the company's purchases from female-
and minority-owned businesses, promote diversity training, and reward
managers who accomplish diversity goals)" An important part of Tex-
aco's approach was that its initiatives did not focus solely on racial di-
versity. Even though the genesis of the litigation was in allegations of
race discrimination, Texaco's consultant Judge Higginbotham stressed,
and the company adopted, a broader view of the need to develop poli-
cies that would promote antidiscrimination and equality along a variety
of dimensions, not just racial diversity. 178
In 1996. when it announced the settlement. Texaco set numerical
goals for itself. 179 Bijur pledged to increase minority employees from
twenty-three to twenty-nine percent, black employees from nine to
thirteen percent. and female employees from thirty-two to thirty-five
percent by 2000. 180 Although Texaco's hiring patterns reflected this
commitment, 181 the volatility of the energy market and attrition, vol-
untary retirements, and the acceptance of generous severance pack-
ages when Texaco announced its merger with Chevron in 2000, frus-
174 Gail Appleson, EEOC to Monitor Texaco's Hiring for Five Years, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan.
4, 1997, at 1.
175 Eichenwald, supra note 43.
176 Id.
177 Id.: see also CRONIN-HARRIS & WHITE. sum/ note 161, at 37-38,
'178 CRoNIN_HARRIS & WHITE, supra note 161, at 13-15.
179 Eichenwalci, supra note 43.
18° Id.
191 CRONIN-HARRIS & WHITE, supra note 161, at 34. Kathy Cronin-Harris and David M.
White note that:
[O]f 161 hires by mid-1999, 23% were African-Americans and 49% were
women.... African-Americans constituted 12.4% of 404 new hires and
women constituted 40.6% of the new hires during 2000.... Of 74 new hires
in the first six months of 2001, women constituted 47% and African-
Americans constituted 18.9%.
Id.
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trated the goals. 182
 At the end of 2000, total minority employment was
eqital to its 1996 number at twenty-three percent, whereas the per-
centage of African-American employees had risen only from nine to
ten percent and the nercentaffe of females drooped to twenty-seven
nercent.'" The mere-er of Chevron and Texaco in 2001, has made as-
sessment of further progress in diversity hiring difficult.'"
The company also promised to increase its purchasing from fe-
male- and minority-owned businesses. from 9135 million in 1996. to 31
billion four years later.' 85 In 1998, when Deval Patrick became Texaco's
general counsel, he announced that the company had to date "awarded
more than $400 million in contracts to firms owned by minorities and
women. "186
 The CEO's commitment and the transparency of Texaco
laying out its remedial plans may have helped set the tone for equal
employment practices; since the settlement, courts have routinely
granted Texaco summary judgment in subsequent reported discrimina-
tion cases against it. 187
3. The Mid-1990s: Home Depot
Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., filed in the Northern District of Califor-
nia in 1994, was a pattern or practice suit in which the female plaintiffs,
over 17,000 current and former employees and 200,000 unsuccessful
applicants in ten western states that comprised the company's West
Coast division, alleged that the company engaged in an "entirely sub-
jective" pattern of hiring, promotion, training, and compensation deci-
182 Id.
188 Id. at 33-34.
184 Id. at 40.
188
 See Texaco's Spending with Minority Firms Ahead of 5-Year Plan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17,
1999, at 814.
186 Russ Kerber, Boston Murray Deval Patrick to Take Counsel Post at Texaco, Stepping Down as
Head of Task Form Overseeing Finns Treatment of Minorities, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 1998, at Cl.
Neither Home Depot nor Texaco has ranked on the Fortune/Money/CNN "Best Companies
to Work for since before 1998. See Great Places to Work Institute, 100 Best Companies to
Work for '2007, http://www.greatplacetowork.corn/best/list-bestusa-2008.hun
 (last visited
Feb. 28, 2008) (links for years going back to 1998).
187 See, e.g. Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 263 F.3d 394, 417-18 (5th Cir. 2001) (vacating district
court_ order certifying class in race discrimination suit because underlying substantive alle-
gations dismissed); Roger v. Texaco, No. 4:04-CV-205-JEC, 2007 WL 951752, at *10 (N.D.
Ga. Mar. 28, 2007) (granting summary judgment for the defendant in a race and retalia-
tion claim); Rando v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg. Inc., 165 F. Stipp. 2d 1209, 1211 (D. Kan. 2001)
(granting summary judgment for the defendant in a race and disability discrimination
case).
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sions)m This produced a segregated workforce with women in lower-
paving' lobs with limited promotion onnortunities. The case settled only
three days before trial, following a two-day required mediation. 189 In
early 1998, the judge approved a consent decree providing a settlement
fund of $65 million and $22.5 million in attorneys' fees, costs, and ex-
penses. 190
The Home Depot settlement exemplifies what Professor Michael
Selmi calls "the recalcitrance model" in which "the company refuses to
acknowledge any problems or potential liability even while agreeing to
make substantial chances and paving large sums of money in settle-
ment."191 The settlement permitted Home Depot to create its own goals
for compliance with the consent decree) 92 Selmi noted that "Home
Depot has also been reluctant to provide any information regarding the
changes it has made, and the initial progress report required under the
terms of the consent [decree] was filed under seal." 195
Although the emphasis of the Home Depot settlement was mone-
tary, it resulted in some reforms of internal employment procedures)"
A primary complaint in the Home Depot lawsuit had been that super-
visors, who were predominantly men, made subjective decisions about
jobs and promotions that led to a pattern of women being denied ad-
vancement opportunities)95 One structural change implemented as a
result of the consent decree was a job Preference Process that installed
a computer kiosk in each store, into which job applicants or current
employees could input their qualifications and job preferences. 196 This
system was intended to help eliminate subjective decision making based
on stereotypes by automatically including applicants in appropriate job
pools.
The settlement also required the company to interview at least
three candidates for any management position and develop internal
positions to monitor hiring and promotion processes. 197 Finally, the
186 No. C-944-4335-51,1996 WL 421436, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 1996) (order certi-
fying class action).
189 Selmi, supra note 121, at 1285.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 1281.
192 Id. at 1285-86.
198 Id. at 1286.
194 Sarni, supra note 121, at 1285.
198 Butler v. Home Depot, No. C-95-2182 ST, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16296, at *49-50
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1997) (citation omitted).
196 Sturm, supra note 139, at 512-13 (citing Consent Decree at 32, Bullet; 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16296 (No. G95-2182 ST)).
197 Id. at 513-14.
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consent decree mandated that the company report to class counsel on
progress implementing these reforms, at least while the decree was in
existence. 198
In June of 2002, the court ended its oversight more than a year
before the decree was supposed to expire because the court found
"genuine and enthusiastic compliance" by the company with the set-
tlement goals. 199
 Home Depot reported that in the five years between
1996 and 2001, the company had increased female store managers in
the western district from eight to fourteen percent, female assistant
store managers from fifteen to twenty percent, and female sales associ-
ates from sixteen to twenty-two percent. 2" The plaintiffs' attorney,
David Borgen, commented, "We are satisfied that there's been a sea
change of culture at Home Depot and that substantial opportunities
have opened up for women." 201
 On the parties' joint motion, the court
approved the termination of the decree "eighteen months before it was
due to expire" even though the company had "failed to meet half of its
own benchmarks."202
 Whether these structural changes, viewed in the
context of the entire settlement and later events, actually accomplished
the objectives of the initial lawsuit is a matter of some dispute. 2"
199 Id. at 517.
199 Court Ends Supervision of Home Depot Hiring, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 25,
2002, at C2.
200 Joyce E. Cutler, Court Terminates Home Depot Sex Discrimination Consent Decree, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 125, at A5 ( June 28, 2002).
201 Id.
292 Selmi, supra note 121. at 1285-88.
2" Compare Susan Sturm, Lawyers and the Practice of Workplace Equity, 2002 Wis. L. Ray.
277, 302 (viewing the Home Depot consent decree as "constructing the architecture for
accountable, legitimate, and effective problem solving" through developing a "remedial
structure [that] established practices that would generate information needed to address
the problem on an on-going basis, involve people with expertise and responsibility for
implementing the system, and set up internal and external accountability mechanisms.
The deliberative process for remedial formulation included operations people and experts
in system design, as well as plaintiffs' counsel, in-house counsel, and senior human re-
sources professionals."), with Selmi, supra note 121, at 1325 ("During the four years it was
under a consent decree, Home Depot appears to have filed only one progress report,
which provided no data and which the plaintiffs' attorneys summarily approved with the
conclusory statement that the numbers were better than before."). One news publication
described a second suit brought by the EEOC on behalf of a woman who complained she
was passed over for promotion in favor of less qualified men, noting: "This is the second
time the EEOC has sued the Atlanta-based retailer. In August 2001, the EEOC filed a class-
action lawsuit against the retailer for allegedly failing to promote qualified women to lu-
crative positions." See EEOC Sues Home Depot Again for Alleged Sex Discrimination, HOME
CHANNEL. NEWS, Sept. 16, 1992, at 6.
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Intriguingly, in August of 2001, the EEOC filed another class ac-
tion lawsuit against Home Depot on behalf of a woman in Texas for
gender-based promotion discrimination and retaliation. 204 Three years
later, the company entered into a consent decree with EEOC to resolve
another class-wide sex, race, and national origin discrimination and
retaliation lawsuit in Colorado. 205 Home Depot again denied that it had
engaged in any misconduct. 206
4. Mitsubishi
In 1996, the EEOC filed a class action suit against Mitsubishi Mo-
tors on behalf of almost half of the 900 past and present female em-
ployees at one of its plants.207 The allegations were of egregious con-
duct—ranging from verbal abuse and propositioning to groping and
physical assault—and may have been perpetrated by as many as 400 of
2" EEOC Files Cender-Bias Suit Against Home Depot, NAT'L, HOME Grit. NEws. Aug. 27,
2001, at 1. The resolution of this suit does not seem to be a matter of public record.
205  Home Depot to Pay $5.5 Million to Resolve Class Discrimination Lawsuit in Colorado,
WORKPLACE ANSWERS, Aug. 25, 2004, http://www.workplaceanswers.com/News/Home-
Depot-to-Pay-$5.5-Million-to-Resolve-Class-Di63.aspx.
2" Julie Dunn, Home Depot Settles EEOC Lawsuit, DENVER POST, Aug. 26, 2004, at CI. Since
then, numerous other plaintiffs have filed individual suits. See, e.g., Halfacre v. Home Depot
U.S.A., Inc., No. 05-6619, 2007 WL 1028860, at *1 (6th Cir 2007) (granting summary judg-
ment to Home Depot for a race discrimination claim, but denying summary judgment for a
retaliation claim); Beltran v. Home Depot, No. 7:08cv00192, 2007 WL 1960609, at *1 (W.D.
Va. 2007) (denying Home Depot's motion to dismiss concerning a race discrimination claim
brought by an employee); Maldonado v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. EP-06-CA-232-FM,
2007 WL 1849026, at *1 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (granting Home Depot's summary judgment mo-
tion concerning a disability discrimination claim brought by an employee who was termi-
nated); Lewis v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. A-06-CA-058-LY, 2007 WL 1100422, at *9 (WD.
Tex. 2007) (denying Home Depot's summary judgment motion in an age discrimination
case); St. George v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. CV-04-1210-PCT-LOA, 2007 WL 604925, at
*1-2 (D. Ariz. 2007) (describing sexual harassment suit filed by twenty-one women who al-
leged they had been exposed to inappropriate verbal and physical abuse by male employees);
Andrews v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. A.03CV5200, 2005 WL 1490474, at *I (D.N.J. 2005)
(denying Home Depot's motion to strike certification of a class concerning a claim of na-
tional origin discrimination). But that is true for other major corporations as well. See infra
note 261 and accompanying text. The cases against Home Depot, however, seem to be surviv-
ing summary judgment with greater frequency than those against Coca-Cola or Texaco. See.
e.g., Smith, 263 F.3d at 417-18 (vacating district court order certifying class in race discrimina-
tion suit because underlying substantive allegations dismissed); Koget; 2007 WL 951752, at
*10 (granting summary judgment for the defendant in a race and retaliation claim); !Rondo,
165 F. Stipp. 2d at 1211 (granting summary judgment for the defendant in a race and disabil-
ity discrimination case). -
2U7 Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, "Labor's Divided Ranks": Privilege and the United Front
Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1542, 1546 (1999).
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the 3000 male workers there. 208
 It is no small irony that these events
occurred at a plant in the town of Normal, Illinois. 209
When Mitsubishi received the EEOC's charge, it immediately or-
ganized protests, paid 3000 employees to demonstrate, and arranged
to bus them to the Chicago office of the EEOC to protest the suit. 21°
This move generated an exceptional amount of bad publicity, which
prompted Mitsubishi, after only several weeks and before settling the
lawsuit, to hire former U.S. Secretary of Labor Lynn Martin as a con-
sultant to the company. 211
Although the hiring of Martin was perceived as merely "a public-
ity ploy,"212
 Martin and her staff developed a template of more than
thirty recommendations for the company to implement that would
create a model workplace free of sex and race discrimination. 213 To
emphasize accountability, the centerpiece of Martin's recommenda-
tion was a "zero tolerance task force" that would oversee grievance
review. 214 Other recommendations included developing comprehen-
sive sexual harassment training, creating and continually updating
specific job descriptions, implementing merit-based managerial com-
pensation tied to corporate goals, enforcing a uniform code of con-
2°8
 The women autoworkers alleged misogynist conduct in the plant by both male
autoworkers and supervisors, including physically abusing women (e.g., slapping women
on the buttocks, touching their breasts and crotches), pinning sexually obscene signs to
the backs of unknowing women, placing obscene graffiti on the fenders of cars coming
down the assembly line and obscene pop-ups which appeared unexpectedly in the cars
when women were assembling them, wrapping automotive parts in pornographic newspa-
pers, assaulting women with factory equipment (e.g., placing hoses, wrenches, and air
guns between women's legs), playing pranks on women (e.g., dousing the seats of cars that
women must sit on with butane, making obscene motions with bananas, placing plastic
penises in buckets of tools), sabotaging women's work (which sometimes led to injuries),
circulating pornographic photos of production-line workers and nude managers having
sex with women who did not work at the plant during a private party, posting lists on the
walls ranking the women in the plant by their estimated breast sizes, and abusing women
verbally (e.g., referring to women as "sluts," "whores," and "bitches"; referring to them by
their breast size numbers; and asking them about their sexual habits and preferences). Id.
at 1546-47; see also Michael Selmi, Sex Discrimination in the Nineties, Seventies Style: Case Stud-
ies in the Preservation of Male Wmhplace Norms, 9 DO P. RTS. Em P. PO IfY J. 1,20 (2005).
20 Crain & Matheny, supra note 207, at 1548.
211) Peter Annin John McCormick, More than a Tune-up: Tough Going in a Fight Against
Sexual Harassment, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 24,1997, at 50-52.
2L1 See Van Duch, supra note 128; see also Andrea McGrath, Note, The corporate Ombuds
Office: An ADI? Tool No Company Should Be Virithout, 18 HAM LINE J. Pun, L. & Pot.'s 452,452—
53 (1997).
212 McGrath, supra note 211, at 452-53.
213 Cathy Nelligan Norman, How to Create a Model Workplace, Vv. EMI'. L. LErrER, Dec.
1997, at 2.
214 Id.
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duct, surveying employees and reporting findings, adding employee
relations supervisors, offering career planning to all employees, and
creating transparency with an annual "state of the workplace" com-
pany statement.215 The federal district judge to whom the case was
assigned appointed retired Federal Appellate Judge and former White.
House Counsel Abner Mikva to act as a special master and facilitate a
settlement.216 According to numerous reports, Mikva deserves excep-
tional credit for mediating the settlement, 217 although the federal dis-
trict court's decision, in early 1998, that the EEOC had the authority
to bring pattern or practice claims for sexual harassment may have
also played a role in the resolution of the case. 218
In 1998, the EEOC entered a consent decree for $34 million in
monetary relief, the largest settlement amount to that point in history
for a sexual harassment case. 219 Mitsubishi also agreed to revise its
sexual harassment policies and complaint procedures to maintain a
"zero tolerance policy concerning sexual harassment, sex-based har-
assment and retaliation against individuals who report harassment"—
including specific provisions such as the commitment to promptly in-
vestigate and prepare written findings regarding any allegation of
harassment and proposed remedial actions within seven days. 22° The
consent decree installed a panel of three decree monitors for the
three years the decree was in effect. 221 Two years later, the monitors
found that Mitsubishi had made "commendable progress in improv-
ing its systems for preventing [sexual harassment] and dealing with it
appropriately when it occurs."222. At the end of the three-year period,
the monitors approved the progress Mitsubishi made under the con-
216 Michael Bologna, Lynn Marlin Unveils 34-Point Plan for Making Mitsubishi Model
Workplace, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 30, at AA-1 (Feb. 13, 1997).
216 Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Mitsubishi Motor
Manufacturing and EEOC Reach Voluntary Agreement to Settle Harassment Suit ( June
11, 1998) [hereinafter EEOC Mitsubishi Press Release], available at Ittip://www.eeoc.gov/
press/6-11-98.html.
217 See, e.g., Kirstin Downey Grintsley, Mitsubishi Settles Suit for $34 Million, PALM BEACI-I
POST, June 12, 1998, at IA ("Attorneys for both sides credited Abner Mikva ... for helping
to bring the long-warring parties to an amicable resolution after four weeks of talks.").
216 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc.,
990 F. Stipp. 1059, 1071 (C.D. Ill. 1998).
219 EEOC Mitsubishi Press Release, supra note 216.
22° joint Motion for Entry of Consent Decree at 45, Mitsubishi Motor Mfg., 990 F. Stipp.
1059 (No. 96-1192), available at Intp://wwweeoc.gov/policy/docs/mmma.html.
221 Id.
222 Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Monitors Say Mitsu-
bishi in Compliance with EEOC Consent Decree; Sexual Harassment 'Firmly Under Con-
trol' at U.S. Plant (Sept. 6, 2000), available at http://wweeoc.gosipress/9-6-00,html.
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sent decree and supported its termination but reminded the company
"to remain vigilant and proactive in combating harassment." 225
Early indications were that the Mitsubishi lawsuit "stem[med] the
proliferation of harassment," but raised questions whether the steps
taken by the company, including the appointment of six full-time em-
ployees to address harassment complaints and training, were actions
that smaller companies could duplicate. 224
 Some commentators have
questioned whether the Mitsubishi settlement was effective in trans-
forming a discriminatory corporate culture, citing several subsequent
lawsuits alleging racial harassment and age discrimination at the plant
in Normal, Illinois. 225
5. Coca-Cola
In 1999, several individual plaintiffs sued Coca-Cola, alleging sys-
tematic discrimination on the basis of race in salary, promotions, and
performance evaluations, and later added class claims on behalf of
2200 current and former African-American employees. 226 The claims of
managers exercising unbridled subjective discretion in performance
appraisals echoed claims made in the Texaco suit; the allegations, how-
ever, were not of racial invectives but instead of ignoring, overlooking,
and failing to promote qualified blacks.227
In early 2000, public pressure for a settlement mounted. A former
Coca-Cola manager, Larry Jackson, took thirty Coca-Cola employees
with him on a bus ride from Atlanta, Georgia, to the shareholders'
meeting in Wilmington, Delaware, to threaten a boycott of Coca-Cola
products unless Coca-Cola addressed its record on diversity and fair
225
 Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC Responds to
Final Report of Mitsubishi Consent Decree Monitors (May 23, 2001) [hereinafter EEOC
Responds Press Release], available at Imp://www.eeoc,gov/press/5-23-01.hunl.
224 Joanna Grossman, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Do Employers' Efforts Truly Pre-
vent Harassment or Just Prevent Liability?, FusioLAw, May 7, 2002, littp://writ.newslindlaw.
com/grossman/20020507.1ttml.
225 Cheryl L. Wade, "We Are an Equal Opportunity Employer": Diversity Doublespeak, 61
WAsii. & LEE L. REV. 1541, 1552 n.54 (2004) (citing Lisa Chian, Fired U.S. Mitsubishi Man-
agers File Suit, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2001, at Cl; Mitsubishi Settles Racial Discrimination Suit, ST,
LOUIS PosT-DISPATCH, Apr. 2, 2001, at 5).
"6
 Ingram v Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685, 686, 697 (N D. Ga. 2001).
227 Cyrus Mehri et al., One Nation, Indivisible: The Use of Diversity Report Cards to Promote
Transparency, Accountability and Workplace Fairness, 9 FoitnnAm J. CORP. & FIN. L. 395, 433-
35 (2004). This is unsurprising, as the accomplished Cyrus Mehri was lead counsel in both
cases. See supra note 75.
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treatment. 228 The Reverend Jesse Jackson also spoke to the audience at
the shareholders' meeting to pressure Coca-Cola to settle. 229 Less than
two months after this meeting, the plaintiffs and Coca-Cola reached an
agreement to settle in principle and then spent four more months
hammering out the details of the settlement, which was announced in
November of 2000.230
The Coca-Cola consent decree presented several historic features.
Though the $192.5 million was a record settlement amount, key to the
settlement was an independent, seven-member court-supervised task
force that would operate for four years to oversee Coca-Cola's diversity
reform efforts and elimination of subjective decision making, investi-
gate complaints, and report back to the court on progress. 231 Impor-
tantly, the task force recommendations would be binding on the com-
•pany unless Coca-Cola sought judicial relief from the court. 232 Like the
Texaco task force, the Coca-Cola task force comprised an all-star cast:
headed by former Secretary of Labor Alexis Herman, it included M.
Anthony Burns, who was chairman of Ryder System, Inc., and a mem-
ber of the Board of Directors of Chase Manhattan; former chair of the
EEOC Gilbert F. Casellas; labor and employment lawyer Edmund D.
Cooke, Jr.; law professor Marjorie Fine Knowles; former Assistant At-
torney General for Civil Rights Bill Lan Lee; and Rene A. Redwood,
former Special Assistant to Secretary of Labor Robert Reich and execu-
tive director of the Presidential Glass Ceiling Commission. 233 The set-
tlement also required Coca-Cola to hire an ombudsman, who was
housed in a separate facility and would report directly to the CEO of
Coca-Cola, to investigate any complaints of discrimination. 234 In addi-•
tion to funding the task force expenses and salary amply at $44 million,
the settlement provided $83 million in compensatory damages and
back pay for current and former employees, $43.5 million for salary
225 Constance L. Hays, Group of Black Employees Calls for Boycott of Coca-Cola Products, N.Y.
MIES, Apr. 20, 2000, at Cl.
223 Id.
2" See Soft Drink Maker Agrees to Pay $192.5111 to Settle Racial Discrimination Lawsuit,
CNN.com , Nov. 16, 2000, Intp://money.ctin.com/2000/11/16/companies/coke.
231 Joyner & Poe, supra note 125.
232 Ingram, 200 F.R.D. at 688.
253 Fifth Annual Report of the Task Force at 1, Ingram, 200 F.R.D. 685 (No. 1-98-CV-
3679) [hereinafter Fifth Annual Task Force Report}, available at http://www2.coca-cola.
com/ourcompany/task_force_report_2006.pclf.
234 Joyner & Poe, supra note 125.
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equity adjustments over ten years, and attorneys' fees and expenses of
$20.7 million.235
The task force appointed two 'joint experts"—independent in-
dustrial psychologists—to advise it. 238
 These specialists developed a set
of best practices for human resources systems and ensured that Coca-
Cola's proposed systems comported with these practices. As an exam-
ple, the company created job descriptions that reflected the skills
needed for the jobs so that hirings and promotions were based on
skill sets rather than personalities or other subjective factors. In its
first three years, the task force oversaw the development and then
monitored the implementation of those systems. During the fourth
year, the task force marked the progress of the company "in develop-
ing a comprehensive diversity strategy linking diversity to business
goals."237
 The task force oversight and advice worked so well that the
defendant, Coca-Cola, voluntarily requested an additional fifth year of
court oversight. 238
 During the final, extra year of oversight, the task
force assessed the restructuring of the company's personnel practices
over the past five years, the commitment of senior management to the
diversity goals of the settlement, and the measurement of results. 239
The Coke settlement was "the real thing." 24° In the initial settle-
ment, Coca-Cola made a commitment to excelling among Fortune
500 companies in promotion of equal employment opportunities free
from discrimination and to fostering "an environment of inclusion,
respect and freedom from retaliation."241
 The cornerstone of the set-
tlement was embodied in the Statement of Principle: "The Company
recognizes that diversity is a fundamental and indispensable value and
that the Company, its shareholders and all of its employees will bene-
fit by striving to be a premier 'gold standard' company on diversity. "242
Coca-Cola committed to change its corporate "culture by design-
ing and implementing a comprehensive strategy that links diversity to
235
 Ingram, 200 F.R.D. at 688.
256
 These experts were Dr. Irwin Goldstein, Dean of the College of Behavioral Sciences
at the University of Maryland, and Dr. Kathleen Lundquist, a national expert in human
resources process. Fifth Annual Task Force Report, supra note 233, at 2 & n.4.
257 Id. at 3.
2" Id. at 2.
255 Id. at 4.
24u This was an advertising theme for Coca-Cola in the 1990s, See Coca-Cola Television
Advertising Home Page, Themes for Coca-Cola Advertising (1886-1999), http://memory,
loc.gov/ammem/ccmplitml/colatime5.html
 (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). See generally CON-
STANCE L. HAYS, THE REAL THING 340 (2004).
241
 Fifth Annual Task Force Report, supra note 233, at 2.
212 Id.
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business goals and makes diversity a business imperative." 245 The im-
plementation of this goal centered on the construction of Diversity Ad-
visory Councils, led by senior management and charged with responsi-
bilities for achieving results. The Diversity Advisory Councils were
empowered to implement diversity initiatives and were advised to en-
gage in "[r]epeated, consistent internal communications to employees"
about the diversity mission. 244 The company considered achievement of
equal employment opportunity goals as a factor in management bo-
nuses. 248 Coca-Cola committed $1 billion toward launching training
and mentoring programs, working with minority suppliers, and increas-
ing economic partnerships and investment in urban communities. 246
This dearly articulated philosophy— "that diversity is critical to the
success of the business" —produced measurable results.247 In the five
years between 2000 and 2006, Coca-Cola increased diversity considera-
bly among its senior officers, moving from eight percent minorities and
sixteen percent females in 2000, to twenty-one percent minorities and
twenty-seven percent females in 2006. 248 The company also improved
diversity in the pipeline jobs that would later fill senior management
positions, augmenting the percentage of minorities in these jobs from
twenty-one to twenty-seven percent between 2002 and 2006. 249 Of the
company's 824 new hires overall between 2005 and 2006, "nearly 54%
were women, 47% were minorities, and 31% were African-Americans"-
and these percentages were similar to the new hire rates for these
groups between 2004 and 2005. 250
The numbers, of course, do not tell the full story. The task force
conducted anonymous electronic surveys of the entire workforce to
measure employees' attitudes about the diversity climate at Coca-
Cola. 281 With an extremely high response rate of seventy-four percent,
the respondents perceived that the company was committed to both
245 Id. at 5.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 70. In 2007, the company stated that twenty percent of management bonuses
are tied to diversity results. Diversitylnc, Top 50 for Diversity Profiles, No. 4: The Coca-Cola
Company, littp://www.diversityinc.com/public/1801.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
246 Fifth Annual Task Force Report, supra note 233, at 39; see also Associated Press, Coca-
Cola Reaches Settlement in Racial Discrimination Suit, HOUSTON CHRoN., June 15, 2000, at 2.
247 Fifth Annual Task Force Report, supra note 233, at 6,
246 Id. As the report noted, "[t]hat is a 68% increase in women and a 161% increase in
minority membership within the officer ranks in a five-year time span." Id.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 15. •
251 Id. at 21.
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diversity and equal opportunity. 252
 In 2006, the levels of positive re-
sponses on a variety of questions—ranging from whether manage-
ment demonstrated a commitment to diversity to whether employees
believed the company treated them fairly—were the highest they had
been since the task force began surveying employees in 2002, and the
numbers were substantially higher than the baseline levels measured
in the first survey.253
An important part of the Coca-Cola story was the dedication of the
CEOs during the time of the settlement and its implementation. The
CEO at the time of the settlement was Douglas Daft, and his commit-
ment to enhancing diversity within the company led him to hire Deval
Patrick from the Equality and Fairness Task Force to serve as Coca-
Cola's general counsel. 254
 Three years into the monitoring, Neville Is-
dell replaced Daft as Chairman and CEO, and he requested a meeting
with the federal judge overseeing the case to seek an additional year of
court oversight.255
 A former protestor against apartheid when he was a
college student in South Africa, lsdell understood the necessity of mak-
ing diversity programs an integral part of the company's strategic plan,
and commented, "This is not about settling a lawsuit, about complying
with a court order. This is just what we need to do as a business.'" 256
The final task force report applauded the company's progress during
the years of oversight, made specific recommendations for the human
resource systems and their monitoring, and encouraged Coca-Cola to
continue its annual surveys of employee perception of the diversity cli-
mate to "keep holding itself accountable." 257
Judge Richard Story of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia, who oversaw the litigation and settlement, offered
some insights into the success of the Coca-Cola settlement. He said
that in part it was the talents of the extraordinary task force, but in
large part, for Coca-Cola, the "settlement stopped being a way to end
litigation" and became something more. 258
 The defendant developed
a genuine interest in "wanting to create the gold standard of business
practices that other settlements could draw on so as not to reinvent
252
 Fifth Annual Task Force Report, supra note 233, at 21.
253 Id. at 21-23.
254
 William C. Smith, A Bias Buster, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 16, 2002, at A9.
255
 Duane D. Stafford, Coke's Diversity Case Closed, ATLANTA 1-CONST., Dec. 2, 2006, at
CI.
256 Id.
257
 Fifth Annual Task Force Report, supra note 233, at 7.
258
 Telephone Interview with Hon. Richard Story (July 19, 2006).
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the wheel."239 In 2007, Coca-Cola was ranked fourth in the nation on
DiversityInc's "Top 50 Companies for Diversity," based on factors such
as CEO commitment to diversity, hire and retention rates, and sup-
plier diversity. 260 Although Coca-Cola and its bottling enterprises have
faced subsequent employment lawsuits, no courts have certified class
actions against the company, and the vast majority of individual law-
suits have resulted in dismissal of the plaintiffs' suits. 261
Now, this may remind some of the punch line to the joke about
the light bulb—the light bulb has to really want to change. The next
Sections of this Article discuss structural pressures on corporations,
and the hallmarks of successful consent decrees. 262 The final Section
addresses economic arguments that might be persuasive to companies
if they do not have a similar change of heart and independently de-
velop a commitment to diversity practices or are not operating under
a consent decree. 263
B. Risks and Threats as Instruments of Cultural Change
This Section addresses those forces that may initially force a set-
tlement: the threat of litigation and its accompanying costs, as well as
possible negative publicity. 264 In several of the major cases discussed
above, the threat of adverse publicity—coupled with potential eco-
259 Id.
260 Diversitylnc, supra note 245. None of the other major corporations discussed above
(Shoney's, Home Depot, Mitsubishi or Texaco-Chevron) were among the top 50. Id.
21 Sep, e.g., Laosebikan v. Coca-Cola Co., 167 F. App'x 758, 760 (11th Cir. 2006) (af-
firming district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing race discrimination suit);
Espinoza v. Coca-Cola Enter., Inc., 167 F. App'x 743, 743, 744 (10th Cir. 2006) (affirming
summary judgment of race discrimination and retaliation claim where plaintiff altered
employment records and was justifiably terminated); Voltz v. Coca-Cola Enter. Inc., 91 F.
App'x 63, 63 (10th Cir. 2004) (approving the district court's grant of summary judgment
in a race discrimination case alleging failure to promote in which the plaintiff had limited
supervisory experience); Carrion v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New England, No. 3:05-cv-
1720, 2006 WL 3526748, at *4 (D. Conn. Dec. 1, 2006) (granting summary judgment
against a plaintiff who alleged race and national origin discrimination); Johnson v. Coca-
Cola Enter. Inc., No. Civ.A. 05-1479, 2006 WL 2873474, at *1, 12 (VV.D. La. Oct. 6, 2006)
(dismissing reverse discrimination failure to promote claim by a white male); Holman v.
Coca-Cola Enter., Inc., No. 4:05CV1032 HEA, 2006 WL 2460795, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 23,
2006) (granting company's motion for summary judgment in suit alleging racial harass-
ment where the plaintiff had a substantial number of on-the-job rule infractions); Lump-
kin v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. United, Inc., 216 F.R.D. 380, 382 (S.D. Miss. 2003) (denying
class certification to claims brought by a group of black employees who alleged pay and
promotion discrimination over a period of thirty-five years).
262 See infra notes 264-392 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 393-407 and accompanying text.
264 See infra notes 266-317 and accompanying text.
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nomic consequences—prompted the consent decree. 265
 Whether these
risks alone compel a transformation in corporate practices, however, is
unclear.
1. Threats of Negative Publicity
The threat of negative publicity can factor into employment dis-
crimination class settlements, but unless a company desires to become
a model citizen like Coca-Cola, the public relations aspects of the suits
have operated primarily to induce settlements. The continued litiga-
tion of class suits can garner negativity publicity, cost hundreds of
thousands of dollars in attorneys' fees, and risk significant financial
losses. This set of intertwined concerns—about negative publicity
coupled with other economic risks—has prompted some of the larger
class action settlementS. 266
One of the primary catalysts behind the mammoth Texaco settle-
ment was the release to the public of a secret tape-recording on which
senior company executives made disparaging comments about black
employees and casually plotted the destruction of documents relating
to the ongoing race discrimination suit. 267 Jesse Jackson and other civil
rights leaders threatened a "crippling" nationwide consumer boycott of
Texaco products and a stock divestiture campaign.268 As Professor Ste-
ven Ramirez noted, "Once allegations of Texaco's misconduct surfaced,
its shareholders suffered stunning losses, as its market capitalization
plunged by $1 billion."269 Within eleven days of the release of the tape,
Texaco Chairman Peter Bijur issued a public apology and announced
the $176 million settlement. 279 Although the resolution was compelled
at least in part by the $540 million in damages claimed in the suit, the
settlement came swiftly after disclosure of the tabloid-worthy tapes, and
the company's attention focused on damage control and image. 27 i
265 See Van Duch, supra note 128.
266 See id .
267
 Texaco Does Right Thing, supra note 21.
268 Jason B. Johnson, Jackson Vows Boycott of Companies in Dispute, BOSTON HERALD, Nov.
15, 1996. at 29.
269 Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 85, 108
(2000).
275 See Texaco Signs Settlement in Race-Bias Suit, supra note 157 ("After dragging on for 2
1/2 years, the case was settled in 10 days of urgent negotiations that began Nov. 5, the day
after the disclosure of secret tape recordings of senior Texaco executives denigrating black
workers and plotting to destroy incriminating evidence in the lawsuit.").
271 See id.
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Other examples of the use of adverse publicity to influence set-
tlements include , threatened boycotts at Mitsubishi, public shaming of
Shoney's, and a 'publicity campaign intended to protest Cracker Bar-
rel's policies against hiring gays and lesbians. 272 An open question is
whether the media, consumer, and political pressure that can impel a
quick resolution and settlement undermine the longer term fulfill-
ment of those promises made under pressure. 273 The longer term
successes274 in two of the cases of relatively swift settlements—Texaco
and Coca-Co1a275—suggest perhaps not.
The adverse publicity—and its leverage effect—may depend sig-
nificantly on the type of discrimination and the company against which
it is alleged. As Professor Michael Selmi has pointed out, public sham-
ing for race discrimination may be far more effective than for sex dis-
crimination: "While there is a clear societal consensus against race dis-
crimination—and no company wants to be labeled as racist—there is
far less of a consensus regarding sex discrimination, particularly when
that discrimination is based on common stereotypes." 276 Query whether
allegations like those in the case of Dukes v. Wal-Mart 277 may do some-
thing to raise social consciousness about sexist stereotypes.
Unlike products liability class action suits—like with Bridge-
stone/Firestone tires or tobacco manufacturers agreeing to produce
lower nicotine cigarettes—where a class settlement demands a change
in the product itself, the negative publicity about workplace condi-
tions that employment discrimination lawsuits can generate does not
automatically command consumer attention . 278 It is industry specific.
A component parts supplier or manufacturer of farm equipment or
heavy industrial machinery may not be concerned about public im-
age. With products like those produced by Texaco, Coca-Cola, Pepsi,
272 See, e.g., Steve Early, Our Collective Bargain, NATIoN, Feb. 25, 2002, at 25; Gaiter, supra •
note 125, at B4; Mitsubishi Picketing Concerning Lawsuits Is Readied by Groups, WAir. Sr. J.,
May 8, 1996, at 83; Barbara Presley Noble, Gay Group Asks Accord in Job Dispute, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 1992, at D4; Rayner Pike, Mitsubishi's lbws of Reforms End Boycott, BOSTON Gi.onu,
Jan. 16, 1997, at C2.
273 Selmi, supra note 121, at 1250.
274 See supra notes 258-261 and accompanying text.
273 Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 737
11.146 (2006) (observing that "the case against Coca-Cola was settled without any substan-
tial motions having been decided").
276 Selmi, supra note 121, at 1288-89.
277 See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
272 Reuters, Firestone Settlement Is Approved, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2003, at CIS ("[Fire-
stone} agreed to incorporate technology that improves tire capability at high speeds in the
Manufacture of certain tires for seven years.").
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or Home Depot, the consumer is often a primary end user of the
product. 279
 If the demand for diversity comes from customers that are
companies—insisting, for example, that the law firms to which they
outsource work use female and minority attorneys to do the com-
pany's legal work—this can be influential in changing the law firm's
diversity practices. 28°
A critical question for corporations is whether the public relations
damage will have a financial impact. Although boycotts can cause some
long term reputation damage and the need to address a tarnished pub-
lic image, eventually the negative publicity subsides. 281 Furthermore,
the publicity risks—and thus perhaps any internal impetus to change
behaviors—are much larger for branded corporations because part of
the product they sell is goodwill. 282
 Though the lawsuit and accompany-
ing negative publicity may provide the wake-up call, perhaps the more
significant force driving a settlement is the possibility for financial ex-
posure—the prospects of damages and defense costs. 283
2. Monetary Compensation, Threats of Litigation, and Corporate
Practices
The evidence is mixed as to whether actual lawsuits or simply the
threat of lawsuits (and the accompanying risks of damage awards and
the costs of litigation defense) impels changes in corporate practice.
"J See Allanna Sullivan & Peter Fritsch, 'Texaco Chairman Meets Advocates for Civil Rights,
WAI.I. ST. J., NOV. 13, 1996, at B3 (discussing Jesse Jackson's threat to pickets gas stations if
the Texaco suit was not settled).
280 Angela Brouse, Comment, The. Latest Call for Diversity in Law Firms: Is It Legal?, 75 U.
Mo. KAN. CITY L. Ray. 847, 848-49 (2007) ("As more corporations become committed to
diversity, they in turn expect their service providers to reflect the same commitment to
,diversity. Businesses that have worked hard to present an image that reflects diversity do
not want their attorneys to destroy such a perception."); see also Karen Donovan, Pushed by
Clients, Law Firms Steb UP Diversity Efforts. N.Y. TIMES. fulv 21. 2006. at C6.
sat Cf Richard Kevin Zepfel, Note, Stopping a "Gruesome Parade of Horribles": Criminal
Sanctions to Deter Corporate Misuse of Recombinant DNA Technology, 59 S. CAI.. L. REv. 641, 661
(1986) ("For adverse publicity to be effective, however, studies show that reports must fre-
quently and prominently link the specified corporation with its 'bad' act."). But see Mar-
guerite Rigoglioso, Consumer Boycotts Work—just Ask French Winemahers, STANFORD GRADU-
ATE SCH. Bus. NEWS, Apr. 2006, lutp://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/stratman_
leslie_boycotts.shtml. See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Cooperate Law, 149 U. PA. L.
Ray. 1811 (2001).
282 I am indebted to several participants at the Second Annual Collorinium on Current
Scholarship in Labor and Employment Law, September 29, 2007, particularly Michael
Selmi and Michael Zimmer, for making this point to me.
203 'Texaco Does Right Thing, supra note 21 (release of racially offensive tapes quickly fol-
lowed by Texaco action to improve racial diversity).
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Although some evidence exists that it does, the more specific studies
of the impact of employment discrimination class action settlements
on stock prices and shareholder values suggests not.284 This Subsec-
tion considers the competing positions that, the threat of litigation
and its potential economic consequences change corporate practices
and, conversely, that economic pressures are not significant influences
on corporate practices regarding race and gender equality. 285
First, consider the large amounts paid in recent employment dis-
crimination class action settlements: $132 million by Shoney's, $172
million by Texaco, and $192.5 million by Coca-Cola. 286 On the surface,
these numbers alone might shock a corporation to change its practices
and have some ripple effect in related industries. Yet, a number of stud-
ies indicate that, depending on the size of the company, the size of the
award, and the portion of the settlement that is covered by insurance,
some corporations simply view these as transaction costs, as the costs of
doing business. 287 According to Michael Selmi, who conducted statisti-
cal calculations regarding whether major class action settlements re-
sulted in losses in shareholder value, "the lawsuits do not substantially
influence stock prices, either at their filing or their settlement, and
when there is an effect, it tends to be short-lived .... [T] he lawsuits do
not result in significant financial losses to shareholder value." 288 The
Coca-Cola settlement, for example, was about 0.1% of the firm's capi-
talization for the year, and it may or may not have resulted in the dilu-
tion of share value of about six cents per sixty-dollar share in the year of
the settlement—or that might have been due to other factors. 288 The
Texaco settlement, although impressively large at $170 million, spread
those amounts "out over a five-year period—and the company's 1996
revenue alone exceeded $30 billion."290 Although the $104 million
Home Depot settlement "ate up 20 percent of the company's quarterly
profits,"281 that is only five percent of the company's profits for the set-
tlement year.
284 Selmi, supra note 121, at 1250.
286 See infra notes 286-308 and accompanying text.
286 Gaiter, supra note 125 (Shoney's settlement); Joyner & Poe, supra note 125 (Coca-
Cola settlement); Texaco Signs Settlement in Race-Bias Suit, supra note 157.
281 See Selmi, supra note 121, at 1250.
288 Id.
289 Id,
290 Id. at 1274.
291 Mark Albright, Investors Push Atlanta-Based Home Depot on Diversity, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Apr. 15, 1998, at 1E.
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More general evidence regarding class action cases in the last dec-
ade supports the idea that recoveries did not increase. Professors
Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey P. Miller conducted an examination
of 370 class action lawsuits of all types, including torts, consumer, civil
rights, securities, and employment cases, which were settled in the ten-
year period between 1993 and 2002. They found "no robust evidence
that either recoveries for plaintiffs or fees of their attorneys increased
over time."292
 Over the decade that the study encompassed, the average
settlement was $100 million. 293
 Though the average hit a low of $25 mil-
lion in 1996, and rose to $274 million in 2000—a year that saw four set-
tlements topping $1 billion each—Eisenberg and Miller concluded that
It] he mean client recovery has not noticeably increased over the last
decade."294
 They also found that In] either the mean nor the median
level of fee awards has increased over time . ."295
Some evidence, though, suggests that employment discrimination
lawsuits in the future may cost corporations more. 296 The U.S. Chamber
of Commerce predicts that employment discrimination lawsuits in the
near future will cost corporations "billions and billions of dollars." 297
The lawsuits of the future may herald escalating damages in discrimina-
tion suits, and companies may perceive an increase in the amounts
needed to settle lawsuits and the accompanying risks. 298 Several firms
that have been sued for employment discrimination have worked hard
to repair their images and revisit their practices. 299
 If changes occurring
292
 Geoffrey P. Miller & Theodore Eisenberg, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An
Empirical Study I (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law & Bus., Working Paper CLB-03-017, 2003), avail-
able at h np://w4.stern.nyu.edu/emplibrary/03-0
 7.pdf.
293 Id. at 16. Everything was calculated in inflation-adjusted dollars as of 2002. Id.
294 Id. at 16-17.
295 Id. at 24.
296 See Jerry Crimmins, Pay Claims Lead Class Action Surge: Report, 152 Ct-u. DADA' L.
BULL., Feb. 22, 2006, at I ("In 2005, The top 10 private plaintiff settlements totaled $1.06
billion, while the top 10 government litigation settlements totaled $396.15 million,! ac-
cording to [a national report by Seyfarth, Shaw LLP].").
297
 Betsy Morris et al., How Corporate America Is Betraying Women: Forty Years After Sex Dis-
crimination Became Illegal, a Huge Gap in Pay and Promotions Still Yawns. Now Angry Women Are
Suing Their Employers—and Winning. How Afraid Should You Be!, FORTUNE, Jan. 10, 2005, at
64, 66.
298
 Cheryl Wade, The Impact of U.S. Corporate Policy on Women and People of Color, 71
GENDER RACE & jus -r. 213, 225 (2003) (describing "meteoric rise in amounts paid to settle
discrimination claims").
299
 Institutional Shareholder Servs., U.S. Proxy Voting Manual (2005), http://www.
issueadas.corn/con
 tent/free/content/ menutop/conten t/subscription/usvmfiles/x10455.
html ("Shoney's, Publix Super Markets Inc., and Advantica Restaurant Group, Inc., (which
owns Denny's Restaurants) similarly engaged in aggressive minority hiring and supplier-
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in the securities field are analogous, just as the wave of securities class
actions prompted the creation of internal reviews mechanisms, 30° the
potential for liability may persuade larger corporations to undertake
their own equal employment compliance reviews in advance of litiga-
tion.
Another factor in the litigation risk equation is pressure from
shareholders. The threat of shareholder derivative actions for breach
of fiduciary duties in the failure to investigate or monitor allegations
of discrimination or other shareholder proposals to promote diversity
can compel greater corporate attentiveness to diversity and avoidance
of discrimination. 3° 1 Insistence on disclosure of information can force
transparency about employment practices. 3°2
Actual lawsuits may induce better corporate behavior. In the years
since the tiling of the Dukes class action suit against Wal-Mart in 2001,
the company has established an "Office of Diversity" to promote diver-
sity initiatives. 303 Wal-Mart also "hired outside consultants to improve
the 'objectivity' of job criteria. Officer compensation is now linked to
diversity coals—bonuses are reduced by as much as fifteen percent if
goals are not met."304 In 2006, only the second year that Wal-Mart re-
leased a report on diversity statistics to the EEOC, comparisons with
Wal-Mart's 2005 numbers show that the company made small increases
diversity efforts after being hit with legal claims for discrimination. All three companies
have since ranked among Fomine magazine's top 50 best companies for minorities.").
3°° Although the securities situation is certainly more complicated because of potential
criminal liability, on this issue, see Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions
for Strong Securities Mankets, 48 UCLA L. REA, . 781, 795 (2001).
301 Wade. sutra note 298. at 228-31: Buckridve. supra note 53. at 495 n.266.
302 In 1996, several investment funds urged a shareholder's vote on a resolution that
would "require Shoney's - to account publicly for its efforts since 1994 to reverse discrimina-
tory employment and purchasing practices." Andrea Adelson, Shareholders Press Shoney's on
Bias Issue, N.Y. Trr1Es, Dec. 26, 1996, at 1. Although the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (the "SEC") ultimately upheld the corporation's right to prohibit shareholder resolu-
tions on workplace matters, the company voluntarily agreed to produce the information
the shareholders sought. S.E.C. Upholds Resolution Curb, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1997, at D2.
9°3 Orly Lobel, Big-Box Benefits: The Targeting of Giants in a National Campaign to Raise
Work Conditions, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1685, 1692 (2007).
301 Winnie Chau, Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue and a
Silver Sixpence for Her Shoe: Dukes v. Wal-Mart and Sex Discrimination Class Actions, 12 CA It-
Dozo J.L. & GENT) ER 969, 1004-05 (2006) (noting that the company also "set up a $25
million private equity fund to support businesses owned by women and members of minor-
ity groups over the next five years, although a spokeswoman vehemently denied any con-
nection between the establishment of the fund and the company's legal woes").
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in the numbers of female and minority employees in all categories, in-
cluding managers.305
It is unclear whether employment discrimination lawsuits against
some large corporations induce other corporations to take pre-emptive
reviews of their own pay and promotion practices and undertake diver-
sity initiatives. Some evidence exists that they do. 306
 Professor Orly Lo-
bel suggests that, in the past, automakers such as Ford or General Mo-
tors "shap[ed] labor relations for the market at large."307 Currently, the
larger "Big Box" stores, such as Wal-Mart, serve not only as targets for
labor and antidiscrimination lawsuits to reshape workplaces, but also as
symbols of corporate change and models of best practices. 308
3. Effects of Mandatory Arbitration and Employment Practices
Liability Insurance
Several other factors slant against the efficacy of employment class
actions to send messages to change corporate practices. Two structural
changes in the architecture of lawsuits and financial risks are particu-
larly significant: the rise of mandatory arbitration and employment
practices liability insurance. Employers are increasingly requiring em-
ployees unrepresented by unions—and even union-represented em-
ployees who are under a collective bargaining agreement that contains
a clear waiver of statutory rights—to arbitrate their employment dis-
crimination claims, 309 Mandatory arbitration is pervasive: one survey of
Fortune 1000 companies some years ago revealed that seventy-nine
505 Marcus Kabel, More Women, Minorities Become Managers -
 at Wal-Mart, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Apr. 21, 2007, at 5 ("Women made up 60.9 percent of Wal-Mart's employees last year, com-
pared to 60.5 percent the year before. Minorities were 33.1 percent versus 31.8 percent, in-
cluding blacks at 17.5 percent, up from 16.8 percent. Hispanics accounted for 11.9 percent,
compared to 11.2 percent in 2005. The rate for Asians was 3.1 percent versus 2.7 percent in
2005. ... 1Wolmen made up 39.7 percent of Wal-Mart's managers and officials last year,
compared to 38.8 percent in 2005. Minorities held 23.2 percent of those positions, compared
to 21.3 percent the year before.").
3°6 Lobel, supra note 303, at 1688.
507 a
3°8 Id. (noting that "Wal-Mart employs approximately 1.8 million people in the United
States alone").
309
 FiSC111, su/na note 37, at 190-95; Carol Van Sambeek, The Four Corners Approach to
judging the Enforreability of Arbitration Agreements, Which Waive Statutory Rights to Litigate Em-
ployment Discrimination Claims, 5 APPALACHIAN 11. 247, 253-57 (2006). Individuals, how-
ever, can still bring EEOC charges, and the EEOC can litigate those claims on behalf of
individuals. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Waffle House, Inc., 539 U.S.
279, 282-85 (2002).
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percent of them used arbitration.") Although employees win in arbitra-
tion slightly more than half the time, the monetary value of the awards,
individually arbitrated, does not pose anything like the risks the com-
pany faces in major class action litigation." )
The overlay of insurance must be taken into account in assessing
the deterrent effect of monetary compensation. The employment prac-
tices liability insurance ("EPLI") market is rocketing into prominence.
In 1999, only ten percent of employers had EPLI, but by 2001, over half
of Fortune 500 companies had EPLI coverage—and it is estimated that
within a few more years "70 percent of employers will purchase some
form of that coverage. "312 As just one example, insurance covered a
sizeable part of the Texaco settlement. 313 An open question with em-
ployment practices liability insurance is whether the typical intentional
acts exclusion precludes coverage for disparate treatment suits. 319 Al-
though to obtain EPLI, employers usually must have risk prevention
practices in place, 315 the availability of insurance may diminish employ-
ers' incentives to change their behavior because their exposure to li-
ability is limited.
The evidence about the effect of lawsuits and the threat of lawsuits
on corporate employment practices is mixed." 6 Although the expecta-
tion might be that monetary compensation—particularly on the order
of hundreds of millions of dollars—will create the incentives for
changes in corporate practices, the presence of insurance and the exis-
310 Michael H. LeRoy, Getting Nothing for Something: nen Women Prevail in Employment
Arbitration Awards, 16 STAN. L. & Pot.'Y REv. 573. 578 n.22 (2005) (citing Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Most Large Employers Prefer ADR as Alternative to Litigation, Survey Says, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA), No. 93, at A4 (May 14, 1997). The use of arbitration has increased since the
late 1990s. See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of
Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 Disp. Ri soi.. J. 44 (2004).
511
 Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, Comparing Litigation and Arbitration of Employ-
ment Disputes: Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights in Litigation?, 6 A.B.A, SF.c. Laic.. 1, 1
(2003), http://wwwarb4brum.com/rcontrol/documents/ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/
2003DelikatKleinerConflictManagement.pdf. Another study demonstrated an interesting
gender tilt: male arbitration complainants were more than twice as likely than female arbi-
tration complainants to receive a full award, whereas females were almost twice as likely to
receive a split award—the award of some relief, but particularly the denial of attorneys'
fees. LeRoy, supra note•310, at 599.
312 See generally Duncan, supra note 37.
513 Selmi, supra note 121, at 1274.
514 See Richard A. Bales & Julie McChghy, Insuring Title VII Violations, 27 S. ILL U. L.J.
71, 80-82 (20021.
515 Nancy H. Van der Veer, Continent, Employment Practices Liability Insurance: Are EPLI
Policies a License to Discriminate? Or Are They a Necessary Reality Check for Employers?, 12 CONN.
INS. L ,l . 173, 176 (2006).
3111 See Lobel, supra note 303, at 1688.
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tence of mandatory and binding arbitration both diminish the eco-
nomic leverage. Cumulatively, it appears that although actual lawsuits
may induce changes, the threat of suits and accompanying negative
publicity are not entirely sufficient motivators for change. The next
Section returns to the major employment discrimination class settle-
ments of the past decade and considers the features of those consent
decrees that seem most responsible for changing the business practices
of the companies.317
C. Consent Decrees That Transform Workplace Cultures
This Section addresses the hallmarks of successful consent de-
crees—the situations in which the settlements of major employment
discrimination class action suits have been effective in changing corpo-
rate cultures. 318 Several of the .features of employment discrimination
class actions that seem successful in changing corporate job equality
practices and developing a diversity commitment are extended court
oversight or monitoring, the commitment of corporate executives, and
progress benchmarks or goals. 319 What these features all touch on and
contribute to—and what is absolutely crucial—is accountability. 32°
Those employment discrimination consent decrees that have led to
measurable results in hiring and promotion changes have had key pro-
visions commanding corporate and managerial accountability. This
idea that accountability for change is central is supported by research
in the social sciences.32 ' One of the interesting developments that is
demonstrated by both the history of consent decrees and empirical re-
search is that diversity training—educating employers and employees
about stereotypes and biases—does not alone lead to changes in corpo-
rate cultures. 322
1. Judicial Oversight
One trait of successful consent decrees in the employment context
has been extensive judicial oversight. This is reminiscent of other mod-
els of institutional reform litigation that restructured conditions in
517 See infra notes 318-392 and accompanying text.
318 See infra notes 319-392 and accompanying text.
319 See infra notes 323-394.
329 Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate
Affirmative Action and Diversity Polities, 71 Am. Soc. REv. 589, 611 (2006).
"I See id.
922 See vi.
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schools, prisons, and voting booths—the judicial involvement occurred
over an extended period of time. 323 In the torts and products realms,
courts and the Multidistrict Litigation Panel created quasi-administrative
agencies to patiently oversee the processing of claims. 324 In the employ-
ment discrimination area, the courts that have taken more aggressive
oversight responsibilities have had better outcomes. 325 Conversely— al-
though it is admittedly a small sample—the absence of continued judi-
cial supervision seems associated with a dearth of changes in diversity
practices. 326
Under the terms of the Shoney's settlement, the plaintiffs' lawyers
monitored the company's compliance. 327 Though Shoney's demon-
strated an initial impressive commitment to diversity—rising to the thir-
teenth best of the Fortune top 50 in diversity practices within five years
of the settlement—the company fell off the charts shortly after that. 328
Similarly, the Home Depot settlement required reports to class counsel,
and the court approved termination of the consent decree a year and a
half before it was supposed to end, even though the company had
achieved fewer than half of its goals.329 Although it is not possible to
establish the causal connection and prove the negative—that Home
Depot did not learn a lesson from the earlier class action—it may be
reasonable to conclude that the later class action lawsuits against it with
similar allegations are not a coincidence. 3" Although it is difficult to
trace the reasons—economics, industry changes, or other causes—the
results in both Home Depot and Shoney's suggest that perhaps the ab-
sence of continued judicial scrutiny contributed to the lack of sustained
cultural changes in those two companies."'
323 Mark L. Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1751,1766 (1999) ("The [prison] liti-
gation in Arkansas took seventeen years. The litigation in Texas took twenty years, from
1972 to 1992."); see also Schuck, supra note 101, at 348; supra notes 95-104 and accompany-
ing text.
324 See, e.g., Alexandra D. Lahav, The Law and Large Numbers: Preserving Adjudication in
Complex Cases, 59 FLA. L. REV. 383,411 (2007).
323 See supra notes 154-187,126-261 and accompanying text (discussing Texaco and
Coca-Cola settlements. resnectively).
326 See Selmi, supra note 121, at 1285-88 (discussing lack of judicial oversight of Home
Depot settlement).
527 See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
128 See supra notes 150-153 and accompanying text.
329 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
331} See sutra notes 204-206 and accompanying text.
331 See Selmi, supra note 121, at 1285-88 (discussing lack of judicial oversight of Home
Depot settlement).
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In the case of Mitsubishi, the EEOC initiated the case, which
brought government attention, expertise, and interest in program-
matic reform on the plaintiffs' side. 332 Although the company initially
began with a hard-line defense strategy, it fairly quickly hired former
Secretary of Labor Lynn Martin as a consultants" Retired judge and
then Special Master Abner J. Mikva helped negotiate the consent de-
cree.334
 The decree provided for a team of three respected experts in
employment law to serve as monitors to oversee implementation of
the settlement. 333
 The monitors investigated, tracked progress, and
oversaw the creation of an independent "Opportunity Programs De-
partment" that reported directly to Mitsubishi's president and that
was responsible for all equal employment matters, including the han-
dling of any sexual harassment complaints. 338
 The final report of the
monitors filed with the federal district court concluded that Mitsubi-
shi had made significant progress under the consent decree: "While
its program ... has not been free of problems, we believe Mitsubishi
has exhibited a strong commitment to preventing and controlling
sexual and sex-based harassment in the workplace. Serious incidents
of sexual harassment are rare." 337
 The report urged continued vigi-
lance and the maintenance of the independent department for inves-
tigation of sexual harassment allegations. 338 In light of subsequent
lawsuits against the company at the same plant, query whether three
years of oversight was sufficient.
Two of the megacases, Coca-Cola and Texaco, used task forces to
serve in the position of independent monitors."9
 Both task forces had
highly qualified members. 348
 Both the Texaco Equality and Tolerance
Task Force and the Coca-Cola task force were engaged with the com-
panies, their practices, and their employees. 341 They developed famili-
arity with company policies, practices, and people and oversaw changes
in hiring and promotion procedures. They approached job assessments
with a high level of sophistication, hiring human relations experts to
332 See EEOC Responds Press Release, supra note 223.
333 See Van Duels, supra note 128.
334 See EEOC Mitsubishi Press Release. sutra note 216.
333 Dominic Bencivenga, Mitsubishi Settlement: Outside Monitors Given Insiders' Responsibil-
ity, N.Y.I.,J.Jime 18, 1998, at 5.
336 EEOC Responds Press Release, supra note 223.
337 Id.
338 Id,
"9 See Joyner & Poe, supra note 125.
m See supra notes 165, 233 and accompanying text.
341
 See loyner & Poe, supra note 125.
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advise them.342 The use of these monitoring bodies extended judicial
oversight in effective ways and could serve as a model for implementa-
tion of consent decrees in future lawsuits. 343 In the diversity arena, even
without lawsuits, companies are beginning to use voluntary external
diversity councils. 944
2. Commitment of Corporate Executives
Another feature that is emblematic of successful employment dis-
crimination class settlements is corporate commitment to antidiscrimi-
nation and cultural diversity in the workplace and a high level of en-
gagement by those responsible for implementation of those policies.
Professor Cheryl Wade demonstrates that CEOs have enormous influ-
ence in producing corporate cultures. 345 What matters most in terms of
establishing corporate culture and vision are not promises or pro-
nouncements about diversity and equality, but "the implicit messages
transmitted by context"—in other words, the behaviors, the results
produced, the numbers, and the demonstrated commitment to princi-
ples through the advancement of women and racial minorities. 346
The CEOs in several of the large settlements exhibited an immedi-
ate and attentive focus on diversity and equality. Texaco's CEO Peter
Bijur "quickly acknowledged in public that Texaco had a serious prob-
lem," he settled the lawsuit, and then, after investigation, "fired one
executive and stripped the other two, already retired, of their bene-
fits."347 Even prior to the commencement of the Equality and Fairness
Task Force's investigations, "Bijur insisted that each one of Texaco's
human-resources committees have at least one racial minority and one
woman as a member."348 In the second year of the implementation of
the consent decree, Texaco asked a member of the task force, Deval
Patrick, former head of the U.S. Civil Rights Division, to become its
ti
342 See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
MS Witness the increasing use of corporate monitors in securities, tax, and fraud cases as
adjunct enforcement officers to government regulatory bodies. See generally Vikramaditya
Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 Mtet-t. L.
RF.V. 1713 (2007).
Yoji Cole, Diversity Councils: Task Forces for Change, DrvERsurrINc, Aug. 9, 2006,
http://www.diversityinc.com/public/99.cfm.
345 Cheryl Wade, Transforming Discriminatory Corporate Cultures: This Is Not Just Women's
Work, 65 MD. L. Rxv. 346, 347 (2006).
346 Id. at 372.
347 Rooting Out Racism, Bus. Wit., Jan. 10, 2000, at 66.
5.,11,1
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general counse1. 349
 Corporate boards make a serious statement when
they hire people who have civil rights experience and dedication.
The Coca-Cola settlement also benefited from an exceptionally
committed CEO. Neville Isdell, who joined Coca-Cola during the
middle of the monitoring period, requested a meeting with the judge
overseeing the case, and ultimately Coca-Cola requested an additional
year of court oversight. 350
 Company engagement and support for di-
versity and antidiscrimination is crucial to changing corporate cul-
ture—in particular, leaders who are committed to cultural change. 351
3. Accountability Versus Training
Of the major employment consent decrees discussed above, several
contained provisions that created specific accountability for change. 352
This was accomplished through several different mechanisms: the de-
velopment of standards for job decisions, the construction of diversity
objectives or benchmarks, tying compensation and rewards to attain-
ment of those goals, and, particularly, giving people executive-level au-
thority to make, and responsibility for making, changes that resulted in
greater equality and diversity. 553
One device for creating responsibility for change was to establish
guidelines or procedures that limited freewheeling subjective judg-
ments in hirings or promotions. Thus, the identification of specific
skill sets required for jobs, as the task force did in the Texaco settle-
ment, or qualification and performance standards as the Shoney's
consent decree did, cabined discretion and established parameters for
job decisions. 354
 Even the job kiosks established by the Home Depot
settlement that allowed computerized input of job preferences were
targeted toward this end. 355
A number of the settlements constructed diversity objectives and
tied rewards to attainment of those goals. These benchmarks created
transparency as well as specific objectives and measurable criteria for
349 Reuters, supra note 166.
35°
 See supra notes 238-239 and accompanying text.
351 William Raspberry, Texaco's Lesson: Executives—Not Policies—Set 4Vorkplare Tone, OR-
LANDO SENTINF:I., Nov. 17, 1996, at G3.
352
 See supra notes 141, 174 and accompanying text.
353 See supra notes 141, 179, 180 and accompanying text.
"4 See supra notes 191, 174 and accompanying text.
355 See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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evaluation.356 Shoney's initially linked management rewards to achieve-
ment of diversity goals.357 Texaco and Coca-Cola also rewarded manag-
ers who met diversity objectives.358 All three companies realized meas-
urable results by tying managerial rewards to diversity goals. 559 On the
other hand, the Home Depot eve-of-trial settlement that encompassed
primarily monetary relief did not seem to have procedures in place to
make individuals responsible for attaining the goals of the decree. 360 It
is unsurprising that the company failed to meet half of its goals; what is
more surprising is the joint motion of the parties for termination of the
decree. 361
Texaco even set specific numeric targets for its hiring goals. 362
Coca-Cola's clear establishment of diversity as a hiring and promotion'
priority led to significant increases in the percentages of women and
minorities in management jobs and in positions that fed into manage-
ment jobs. 363
Accompanying these numeric indicators of progress, several of
the settlements created structures of responsibility. They specifically
identified individuals whose job it was to implement working diversity
policies and made these positions executive leve1. 364 The Shoney's
consent decree required the appointment of one senior management
official to be in charge of human resources, along with two recruit-
ment managers' and two employment managers. 365 In the Coca-Cola
settlement, senior managers led Diversity Advisory Councils that were
charged with the responsibility of implementing diversity initiatives. 366
The Texaco task force was extensively involved in oversight and Deval
Patrick ascended to the position of general counsel. In addition, Tex-
aco appointed an assistant to the chairman whose responsibility was
oversight of diversity issues. 367 The company also held focus group
358 See Mehri et al., supra note 227, at 397 (proposing that publicly traded companies
be required to report workforce diversity data with the SEC annually).
357 See Winokur, supra note 144.
358 See supra notes 177, 245 and accompanying text.
359 See supra notes 144-153, 179-184, 247-253 and accompanying text.
360 See supra notes 191-198 and accompanying text.
36 ' See supra notes 201-202 and accompanying text.
382 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
383 See supra notes 248-250 and accompanying text.
3" See, e.g., Haynes, 1993 NT 19915, at *6.
365 Id.
388 See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
317 Warren F. Grienenberger, Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance 371, 391
(PLI Corp. Law and Practice Handbook Series, No. B4-7173, 1997), WL 970 FLI/Corp
371.
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meetings with local managers to create awareness that diversity was a
"corporate imperative ;" implemented a bonus system for managers
who achieved diversity objectives, and changed other recruitment and
succession planning practices. 368
The success of the measures in several class action consent decrees
that created structures of accountability is supported by research on
corporate practices outside the class action context. Three sociologists,
Alexandra Kalev of the University of California, Berkeley, Frank Dobbin
of Harvard, and Erin Kelly of the University of Minnesota, just com-
pleted a pathbreaking study of more than seven hundred private sector
workplaces between 1971 and 2002, to compare the effectiveness of
several antidiscrimination measures and strategies at increasing diver-
sity in the bottom ranks of management. 369 The researchers compared
Employer Information Report EEO-J data that private companies are
required to submit to the EEOC with survey responses from those
businesses to assess seven methods of promoting diversity within corpo-
rations: affirmative action plans, diversity committees, diversity manag-
ers, diversity training, diversity evaluations for managers, networking
programs, and mentoring programs.37° They found that "[s] tructures
that embed accountability, authority, and expertise (affirmative action
plans, diversity committees and task forces, diversity managers and de-
partments) are the most effective means of increasing the proportions
of white women, black women, and black men in private sector man-
agemen t. "371
Although a myriad of factors affect diversity (organizational struc-
ture, the legal environment, diversity in the internal and external labor
pools that feed jobs, and composition of the top management, among
other factors), the findings are striking because of literature that has
developed about stereotyping and bias. Numerous studies have found
that cognitive biases and ingroup and outgroup stereotyping occur un-
thinkingly. 372 For years, the thought among corporate managers has
been that using diversity training to create awareness of these uncon-
3613 CRONIN-HARRIS & WHITE, supra note 161, at 26, 37-38, 41.
369 Kalev et al., supra note 320, at 589.
37° Id. at 590.
371 Id. at 611.
372 See, e.g., Nilanjana Dasgtipta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgrew'? Favoritism, and
Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 Soc. JUST. RES. 143, 147 (2004). See generally Linda Ham-
ilton Krieger, The Context of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186-1217 (1995) (reviewing cogni-
tive bias literature); Denise Sekaquaptewa et al, Stereotypic Explanatory Bias: Implicit Stereotyp-
ing as a Predictor of Discrimination, 39 j. ExPER1NIENTAL SOC. PSYCHOS.. 75 (2003).
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scions biases would help eradicate them and lead to equality and fair-
ness in the workplace." What the Kalev study found was that this as-
sumption of education as a cure made "a leap of faith between causes
and remedies," and that altering structures of responsibility is instead
the best way to accomplish organizational change with respect to diver-
Sity. 374
A somewhat surprising finding was that diversity training had a neg-
ligible effect on the admission of women and minorities to the ranks of
corporate management. The researchers discovered that "[p]ractices
that target managerial bias through feedback (diversity evaluations) and
education (diversity training) show virtually no effect in the aggre-
gate."375 These biases can be viewed as "'irresistible stereotypes,' or bi-
ases so deeply ingrained that they simply can't be taught away in a one-
day workshop." 376 Indeed, some research shows that diversity training
programs can, paradoxically, activate bias, create backlash, and have "a
negative effect on the promotion of minorities." 377 If employees per-
ceive corporate policies as unfairly creating opportunities for only some
employees--say, minorities and women—they are unlikely to comply
with those policies and rules.378
The Kalev study found that although the effects of various anti-
discrimination measures vary across subgroups of white women, black
women, and black men:
Structures establishing responsibility (affirmative action plans,
diversity committees, and diversity staff positions) arc followed
by significant increases in managerial diversity. Programs that
target managerial stereotyping through education and feed-
back (diversity training and diversity evaluations) are not fol-
375 See, e.g., Marken A. O'Connor, The Enron Roar& The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1233, 1309-10 (2003).
574 Kalev et al., supra note 320, at 591.
3Th Id. at 611.
376 Lisa Takeuchi Cullen, The Diversity Delusion, TIME, May 7, 2007, at 74.
377 Kalev et al., supra note 320, at 594 (citing Kimberly D. Ki -awiec, Cosmetic Compliance
and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 514 (2003)); see also Deborah
L. Kidder et al., Backlash Toward Diversity Initiatives: Examining the Impact of Diversity Program
justification, Personal and Group Outcomes, 15 1NT't, J. CoNmicr MGMT. 77, 79 (2004); cf.
Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative Action Became Diversity Management: Employer
Response to Antidiscrimination Law, 1961 to 1996, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 960, 963 (19118)
(noting that diversity training may he displacing affirmative action). See generally HELEN
HEMPHILL & RAY HAINES, DISCRIMiNATIoN, HARASSMENT, AND THE FAILURE OF DIVERSITY
TRAINING: WHAT To Do Now (1997).
375 See Torn R. Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Wank Set-
tings, 70 Mom L. REV. 1287, 1299-1301 (2005).
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lowed by increases in diversity. Programs that address social
isolation among women and minorities (networking and
mentoring programs) are followed by modest changes. 379
In specific, the findings showed that following adoption of an affirma-
tive action plan, "the odds for white men in management decline by 8
percent; the odds for white women rise by 9 percent; and the odds for
black men rise by 4 percent" with no significant effects for black
women. 38° The creation of a diversity committee increased the odds for
white women to enter the ranks of management by nineteen percent,
the odds for black women by twenty-seven percent, and the odds for
black men by twelve percent, while the implementation of a full-time
diversity staff increased those odds by eleven percent for white women,
thirteen percent for black women, and fourteen percent for black
men. 382 Diversity training, on the other hand, "is followed by a 7 per-
cent decline in the odds for black women, ... a 6 percent rise in the
odds for white women, but an 8 percent decline in the odds for black
mell."582
The analysis in the Kalev study that accountability matters more
than diversity training comports with the results of other studies of
organizations and behavioral change, as well as several of the larger
employment discrimination class action consent decrees and other
companies' experiences outside the class settlement context 383 The
major consent decrees required diversity training as part of the set-
tlement. As described by Professor Susan Sturm, the diversity training
offered by Texaco sounds problematic, if not laughable:
Texaco also agreed to transform its corporate culture by re-
designing and expanding its sensitivity awareness and diversity
training programs. Texaco's revamped diversity program con-
sists of a two-day seminar. On the first day, Awareness Day,
employees are encouraged to uncover the negative assump-
tions they have of others and how their own behavior influ-
ences those around them. Games and exercises help each
379 Kalev et al., supra note 320, at 590.
38° Irl. at 602, 604.
381 Id. at 604.
3/32
383 See, e.g., Earnest Friday & Shawnta S. Friday, Managing Diversity Using a Strategic
Planned Change Approach, 22 J. MGMT. DIN. 863, 864 (2003) (suggesting that treating diver-
sity as a distinct and valuable phenomenon, and aligning "the organization's diversity ini-
tiatives (designed to manage diversity) with the organization's strategic goals" will make
diversity "an integral part of the organization's culture").
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trainee with the process of self-evaluation. The clay ends with
trainees writing a personal action plan to facilitate their be-
havioral change. Day two focuses on diversity issues. Among
other activities, employees are shown a video cartoon entitled
"A Peacock in the Land of Penguins." Although the video is
designed to promote cultural understanding, one commenta-
tor described it as filled with stereotypical assumptions about
women and minorities. 384
In addition, Texaco refused to subject its ranks of supervisors to diver-
sity training, possibly because "it had put 80%' of its existing supervi-
sors through diversity training the year before the task force was even
constituted. "say
Some of the disappointing results of diversity training may have
to do with the substance of the programs. One study of small and mid-
size organizations' diversity training in a region of the Midwest
showed that it was ineffective because it began and ended simply with
awareness levels of knowledge and failed to tie the training to any of
the businesses' initiatives..386 Other researchers demonstrate how time-
limited diversity training usually is, with one study reporting that "the
vast majority of [diversity] training programs (72%) last a day or
less.""7 Although harassment training can raise awareness of legal re-
sponsibility, it does not seem to have "long term effects on attitudes or
behavior." Although it is doubtful that diversity training reduces
discriminatory or harassing behavior, accountability for antidiscrimi-
nation and diversity does produce results.
Apart from consent decrees, companies that have undertaken ag-
gressive diversity efforts with clear accountability have yielded impres-
sive results. As one example, in 2000, General Electric appointed Deb-
orah Elam as vice president and chief diversity officer and
implemented strategies for creating employee networks, establishing
384 Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute, for a Pound of Cure: Con-
fronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment Discrimination
Lan', 22 BERKELEY 1. EMP. & LAB. L. 1. 27 (20011 (footnotes omitted).
383 CRONIN-HARRIS & WHITE, supra note 161, at 38.
386 Linda M. Hite & Kimberly S. McDonald, Diversity Training Pitfalls and Possibilities: An
Exploration of Small and Mid-Size US Organizations, 9 HUM. RESOURCE DEV. INT'L 365, 365
(2006).
387 Bisont-Rapp, supra note 384, at 40 n.319 (citing Sara Rynes & Benson Rosen, A Field
Survey of Factors Affecting the Adoption and Perceived Success of Diversity Training, 48 PERSONNEL
PSYCHOL. 247, 257 (1995)).
388
 Kimberly Krawiec, Organizational Alisconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32 FI.A.
ST. U. L. REV. 571, 596 (2005) (citing studies).
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formal mentoring arrangements, recruiting at colleges with high per-
centages of minority students, and holding frequent planning meetings
regarding diversity efforts. 389
 The percentages of women and minorities
among General Electric officers rose from twenty-two percent in 2000,
to thirty-four percent in 2005, while the percentages of women and mi-
nority senior executives rose from twenty-nine percent to forty percent
during the same time frame. 39°
These results are not just the isolated experiences of a single com-
pany that created an executive-level diversity officer. Though more than
three-quarters of the Fortune 1000 companies had some form of diver-
sity program by 2001, those companies that made managers responsible
for achieving diversity goals ranked highest in terms of results: "[oil' the
top 50 best companies for minorities, 38 tied manauers' bonuses to di-
versity goals."391 The cumulative evidence from class action settlements
and other corporate experiences in efforts to promote a diverse work-
force is that diversity training may not yield results, but oversight and
accountability do.
Most of the results discussed in this Section occurred in contexts in
which a company wanted to reform its culture or was under a consent
decree in which the company had promised to do so. The final Section
addresses prospects for arguments that might be useful in developing
corporate commitments to diversity in companies that are resistant to
change. 392
D. Corporate Cultural Change and the Economic Case for Diversity
One factor in the implementation of consent decrees that seemed
to be important in bringing about workplace change was a commit-
ment to diversity and equality by CE0s. 393 Corporate responsiveness
may not depend exclusively on the goodwill of directors or CEOs. Cor-
porations are beginning to understand that diversity in the workforce
and in management correlates with financial success. Numerous stud-
ies, both in this country and others, have demonstrated that "diversity is
good for business." 394
389 Lisa Takeuchi Cullen, Employee Diversity Tmining Doesn't Work, TIME, Apr. 26, 2007, at
74.
"°
391 Institutional Shareholder Servs., supra note 299.
392 Ste infra notes 393-407 and accompanying text.
993 See supra notes 163, 177, 186, 254-259 and accompanying text.
994 Wilkins, supra note 45, at 1553.
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In America, businesses are responding to a number of trends that
have emerged in the past fifteen years, including the increasing labor
share and consumer power of women and minorities. 395 Those corpo-
rations that understand the economics of diversity are developing di-
versity initiatives, hiring "diversity consultants," creating supplier con-
tracts with minority businesses, and even signing amicus briefs in
support of affirmative action. 396
The social argument in favor of diversity is that diverse perspec-
tives on issues result in "decisions [that] are much more reflective of a
well-rounded and robust exchange of ideas." 397 The market argu-
ments in favor of diversity are compelling. The Federal Glass Ceiling
Commission examined early data about workforces among the top
500 Standard and Poor's companies that were diverse along race and
gender dimensions: "[t]he researchers found that the stock perform-
ance (annualized return) of the 100 companies making the strongest
efforts toward equal employment opportunity (EEO) was 2.5 times
greater than that of 100 companies that rated lowest in EEO effort." 398
Other studies support the conclusion that business with higher per-
centages of women and people of color on their boards of directors
395 Id. at 1556; see also Rita Barreto Craig, Taking Diversity to a Higher Level, 10 HR ADVI-
SOR.: LEGAL & PRAC. GUIDANCE, Feb. 2004, at 2 ('The majority of the people entering the
workforce today and in the future will be people of color, women, and immigrants. Nearly
54 million people in the United States have disabilities. They represent the largest 'non-
ethnic minority' group.").
595 WiIUDS, supra note 45, at 1553; see also Brief for Amid Curiae 65 Leading American
Businesses, Gratz v. Bollinger, No. 02-241, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) & Gruner v. Bollinger, No.
02-516, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). A debate has raged for decades in legal scholarship between
the "property" and "social entity" theories of corporate governance—whether manage-
ment's job is solely to maximize profits or to use some of those profits to further social
causes. See generally William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation,
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261 {1992). Understandings are beginning to develop that corporate
social responsibility offers economic advantages, see, e.g., Mark Freeman, Doing Well by Do-
ing Good: Linking Human Rights with Corporate SelfInterest, 6 INT1 Bus. L.J. 741, 744 {2001),
and jurisdictions have passed constituency statutes that authorize corporate directors who
might otherwise fear shareholder suits to consider effects of corporate action on multiple
constituencies in addition to shareholders. See Eric W. Otis, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 14, 27-28 (1992).
397 Carl G. Cooper, Diversity: Denied, Deferred or Preferred, 107 W. VA. L. Rix. 685, 688
(2005).
398 Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizenship at Ground Level: The Consequences of Nonstate Action,
54 Dun: LJ. 1591, 1615 (2005) (citing FED. CPI-ASS CEILING COMM'N, U.S. DEPT OF LABOR,
GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION'S HUMAN CAPITAL 14 (1995)).
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or in executive-level jobs "'outperform the stock performance of
companies without women or people of color in these positions.'" ° 9
These results correspond with experiences of European compa-
nies—that diversity improves not just corporations' reputations or im-
ages but also permits employee recruitment from a broader talent
pool, promotes employee retention, and produces tangible financial
benefits." Diverse companies are also better able to relate to different
cultures in a global marketplace. European studies show that workforce
diversity leads to greater innovation in products and the promotion of
new services:101 In one survey, of 495 European companies responding,
eighty-two percent thought that diversity initiatives had a positive effect
on their businesses."
Some evidence is emerging that, although the largest corporations
understand the business case for diversity, small and mid-size compa-
nies do not." Smaller companies may have less motivation to diversify
their workforces because some of the advantages of diversity—such as
hiring from larger talent pools or marketing to ethnic communities or
foreign markets—may not be among the pressing concerns of small or
mid-size businesses." Mid-level managers.may resist a "[t]op-down ini-
tiative" in favor of diversity that they perceive as threatening—although
it is at this level that information about the business justifications for
diversity initiatives may be most effective." Similarly, some of the costs
of diversity—such as navigating interpersonal conflicts among dissimi-
399 Arouse, supra note 280, 851-52 (quoting Executive Diversity Services, Inc.,
hup://www.executivediversity.com/case/index.hun (last visited Feb. 28, 2008)); see also
David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value 16 (Okla. State
Univ., Working Paper, 2002), available at littp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract_
id=304499.
400 EUROPEAN COMM'N, THE BUSINESS CASE MR DIVERSITY: GOOD PRACTICES IN THE
WORKPLACE 5 (2005), available at http://ec.europa.ett/employment_social/publications/
2005/ke7005617_en.pdf.
401 Id. at 5-6.
402 Id. at 29.
4°' See infra notes 406-407 and accompanying text.
404 CIRIMUildS011 & Hartenian, supra note 46, at 28-29. Also, at least in the torts arena,
small business owners do not worry much about being sued. See John Tozzi, After the $54M
Dry Cleaner Lawsuit, Bus. Wit., July 9, 2007, available at littp://www.businessweek.com/
smallbiz/content/ju12007/sb2007079_276352.htm (noting that in 2006 members of the
National Association of Manufacturers ranked fear of litigation last on a list of 10 factors
hurting their businesses").
405 See Donald C. Langevoort, Overcoming Resistance to Diversity in the Executive Suite:
Grease, Grit and the. Corporate Promotion Tournament, 61 WAsn. & LEE L. REV. 1615, 1634,
1635-40 (2004); see also Ramirez, supra note 269, at 128 (arguing that boards of directors
have a fiduciary obligation to avoid diversity mismanagement).
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lar employees—or at least the perception of those costs, can be ampli-
fied in smaller companies. 406 Yet, the economic advantages of diversity
accrue to small businesses as well. One study of over 200 small busi-
nesses (fifty-seven percent with Fewer than fifteen employees), includ-
ing corporations, sole proprietorships, and partnerships in a major
metropolitan area, concluded that "rnirms with more culturally diverse
work forces were found to have a greater positive percentage change in
revenue, net income, and CEO income in selected years than firms
with less culturally diverse work forces." 407 It is with this population of
small to mid-size companies that education about the business advan-
tages of diversity could have the greatest impact.
CONCLUSION
This Article focuses on the attributes of employment discrimina-
tion class action settlements that are effective in promoting changes
in workplace customs and practices regarding equality and diversity.
One piece of the informational picture emerging from the experi-
ences with these settlements—and one that is supported by organiza-
tional research in the social sciences—is that education alone (in this
context, diversity training) seems fairly ineffective in changing work-
place cultures. What is most effective is accountability and responsibil-
ity for organizational change. This has been produced in different
ways in the various cases.
In some cases, such as Texaco and Coca-Cola, the creation of or-
ganizational structures—initially task forces engaged in oversight, and
later internal, executive-level positions responsible for continuing cul-
tural change—mattered in terms of the numeric representation of
women and people of color in the workforce and in the pipeline for
management jobs. A number of the settlements had progress bench-
marks and created transparency in their hiring and promotion prac-
tices, either by publishing their numbers to the EEOC as Texaco did,
opening their process to applicants by soliciting employee prefer-
Ramirez, supra note 269, at 129. See generally Frances Milliken & Luis Martins, Search-
ing for Common Threads: Understanding the Multiple Effects of Diversity in Organizational Groups,
21 ACAD. Mown REV. 402 (1996).
4 °7 Linda S. Hartenian & Donald E. Cudmundson, Cultural Diversity in Small Business:
Implications for Firm Performance, 5 J. DEVELOPMENTAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 209, 209, 211
(2000); see also Steven R. Ash, I%/,y Should Small Businesses Care About Employee Diversity!: Five
Areas of Research that Influence Organizational Results, 20 J. SMALL Bus. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP
223, 226 (2007) ("Experimental evidence indicates that groups composed of members
with dissimilar characteristics are more creative than homogenous groups.").
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ences for jobs as Home Depot did, or creating specific objectives and
measurable criteria for promotion into job categories as several com-
panies did. Specific measures of accountability tied managerial sala-
ries to the achievement of diversity objectives. Time and patience
were important too. In the Mitsubishi case, judicial oversight lasted
only three years. 4°8 In Home Depot, the decree was terminated eight-
een months before it was supposed to expire® Although no single
factor correlates with the success or failure of any individual settle-
ment, it is notable that both Mitsubishi and Home Depot faced addi-
tional lawsuits subsequent to these class actions." )
The consent decrees reviewed in this Article may be sui generis in
terms of their size. They were accompanied by the commitment of
adequate resources to create executive-level diversity officers and re-
solve pay equity problems. A number of results, though, can be ex-
trapolated from these large models to replicate on a smaller scale with
companies that may not have the same financial resources. One of the
most important features of cultural change—creating accountability
for it—does not depend on corporate resources. Other features of
class settlements that may be more readily adopted by smaller compa-
nies are evaluations of the fairness of personnel review processes, and
the revision of internal practices to promote transparency of the
process or to create specific objectives and measurable criteria for
promotion into job categories. 411 For companies of all sizes, many of
these are just good practices that will help provide some inoculation
against' future lawsuits.
The business management literature suggests that though larger
companies are persuaded by the economic case for workforce diver-
sity, small and mid-size companies may not be. One danger of promot-
ing the market support for diversity is that exclusively economic ar-
guments can overshadow the moral or philosophical case for racial
justice. Some commentators worry that if economic arguments are
stressed, this shifts the focus away from the heart of the antidiscrimi-
nation principle.412 At this juncture, however, the value of the infor-
408 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
405 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
410 See supra notes 204-206,225 and accompanying text.
411 Hawkins. supra note 51. at 58-61.
112 See Thomas W. Joo, Race, Cwporate Law, and Shareholder Value, 541 LEGAL Eouc. 351,
352 (2004). See generally Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit
Analysis of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 795 (sug-
gesting various limits on the market arguments for diversity among executive level officers
and directors).
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mation about the benefits of diversity needs to be more widely dis-
seminated. Although most major corporations seem aware of the eco-
nomics benefits of having their workforces resemble the demograph-
ics of the nation, smaller companies may be less attentive and
responsive to the need for diversity. 413 This may be the point where
education within corporations—not diversity training, but education
about the economics of diversity—could change the contours and
practices of the workplace.
413 See Paul Fryrner & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action: Law
and the New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 709 (2004).
